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ESSAY
IN THE SHADOW OF DELAWARE?
THE RISE OF HOSTILE TAKEOVERS IN JAPAN
CurtisJ Milhaupt*
Despite longstanding predictions to the contrary, hostile takeovers have
arrived in Japan. This Essay explains why and explores the implications of
this phenomenon, not only for Japanese corporate governance, but also for
our understanding of corporate law development around the world today.
Delaware law figures prominently in the recent Japanese events. A high-
profile battle for corporate control has just generated a judicial standard for
takeover defenses that might be called a Unocal rule with Japanese charac-
teristics. Meanwhile, ministy-endorsed takeover guidelines have been formu-
lated that are heavily influenced by the familiar "threat" and "proportional-
ity" tests under Delaware law, along with many of the doctrinal nuances
following Unocal.
At one level, these developments provide powerful support for conver-
gence theories, illustrating the intellectual appeal of Delaware corporate law's
shareholder-oriented model in the world today. But closer analysis suggests
that a more complex process of selective adaptation is under way. The pro-
cess suggests not so much a convergence ofJapanese and Delaware law as a
highly unpredictable telescoping and stacking of two decades of Delaware
takeover jurisprudence onto existing Japanese institutions-a process whose
important features are masked by the prevailing analytical constructs in the
comparative corporate governance literature. Successful economies do not
abandon their institutions for foreign models; they adapt features of other
systems that offer the potential to address emergent shortcomings in their own
systems. The true appeal of Delaware corporate law may reside in its suita-
bility to this process of selective adaptation, rather than in its superior share-
holder protections.
* Fuyo Professor of Law; Director, Center for Japanese Legal Studies; Chair,
Transactional Studies Program, Columbia Law School. I thank Tomotaka Fujita, Hideki
Kanda, Geoff Miller, Kenichi Osugi, Ed Rock, Mark West, and colleagues John Coffee,
Merritt Fox, Ron Gilson, Jeff Gordon, Hugh Patrick, Katharina Pistor, and Charles
Whitehead for comments and discussions on earlier drafts. The American Chamber of
Commerce in Japan, the Columbia Law Review, the Federal Judicial Center Program on Law
and Business, the Fourth Annual Asian Corporate Governance Conference in Seoul, the
University of Michigan Law and Economics Workshop, the Research Institute of Economy,
Trade and Industry, and the University of Tokyo Summer Program on Global Trends in
Corporate Law provided stimulating environments in which to present this Essay. Nick
Benes generously shared information and insights. Ko Wakabayashi provided excellent
research assistance. Any shortcomings in the Essay remain despite this wealth of assistance,
and the commentators listed above do not necessarily share my interpretations and




The unthinkable has happened. Just a few years ago, it could confi-
dently be asserted that "[t]here is no market for corporate control in
Japan, and there is not likely to be one."1 No conventional wisdom
seemed more accurate and enduring than the disdain for U.S.-style hos-
tile takeovers in Japan-the land of stable, friendly shareholders, expan-
sive views of corporate purpose that go well beyond shareholder wealth
maximization, and abiding social concern for the preservation of harmo-
nious relationships. But things change, and predictions are risky. For the
past year, Japan has been riveted by a series of contests for corporate
control, featuring sharp-elbowed tactical maneuvering, strategic litiga-
tion, and creative use of corporate law to craft defensive measures. To be
sure, the number of hostile deals to date is small. The significance of
these transactions derives not from their prevalence but their mere exis-
tence and the potential changes they may bring about. Two of the recent
deals have generated important judicial rulings.2 Public discourse-
down to the sports pages-has been filled with blow-by-blow accounts of
the deals, along with corporate law arcana such as the intricacies of the
poison pill. 3 Virtually every major actor in the Japanese political econ-
omy has mobilized to respond to this development.
Equally notably, a small state on the Eastern seaboard of the United
States casts a long shadow over these developments. Perhaps predictably,
perhaps not, Delaware's experience with takeovers looms large in the Jap-
anese consciousness. 4 In a recent and high-profile case-a takeover at-
tempt by an upstart internet service provider of a radio broadcasting firm
affiliated with Japan's largest media conglomerate-both sides briefed
the trial court, deciding whether to enjoin the target's defensive measure,
on how the case would be resolved under Unocal and its progeny.5 The
trial court enjoined the defensive measure and the decision was affirmed
on appeal. These rulings generated judicial standards for review of the
most common defensive measure in Japan that would resonate well with
the Delaware judiciary-a kind of Unocal rule with Japanese characteris-
1. Neil Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-
First-Century Capitalist Societies 187 (2001).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 70-73.
3. See Todd Zaun, Rebel Raider Takes Aim at Broadcast Giant in Japan, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 24, 2005, at C9 (reporting on sensation created by recent takeover attempt).
4. Full disclosure: The author organized a Tokyo conference in 2003 entitled
"Hostile M&A and the Poison Pill in Japan: Prospects and Policy," at which prominent
academics and lawyers from both countries, a Delaware judge, and a Japanese shareholder
activist discussed the U.S. experience with the poison pill and the possible lessons it
offered forJapan. For conference proceedings, see Symposium, Poison Pill inJapan, 2004
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1 (2004).
5. See, e.g., Memorandum from John C. Coffee, Jr., Dir., Ctr. on Corporate
Governance, Columbia Univ. Sch. of Law, to Tokyo Dist. Court, Civil Dep't No. 8 (Mar. 8,
2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Coffee Opinion].
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tics. 6 Meanwhile, Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
(METI) formed a group of experts and business representatives to craft a
governmental response to the rising tide of unsolicited bids. The group's
report prominently noted that its purpose was "to begin developing a
framework for fair and reasonable hostile takeover defensive measures
that would enhance corporate and shareholder value based on Anglo-
American measures that are accepted as a global standard. '7 The group
conducted an in-depth investigation into U.S. takeover precedents and
defensive techniques, and its report embraces Delaware takeoverjurispru-
dence, including the "threat" and "proportionality" rules familiar to
American corporate lawyers, in suggesting appropriate standards for Ja-
pan.8 Based on this report, guidelines promulgated jointly by METI and
the Ministry ofJustice in May 2005 draw upon key principles in Delaware
doctrine.9 The shareholder rights plan, better known as the poison pill,
symbol of U.S. hostile mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity, is vali-
dated as a defensive measure by the report and the guidelines and ap-
pears to be on the verge of widespread adoption in Japan.
What happened? What are the implications of these developments?
If, as now seems distinctly possible, the world's second largest economy is
in the process of embracing hostile M&A (however reluctantly), and
along with it the core of Delaware takeover jurisprudence, this develop-
6. See infra text accompanying notes 72-73. Unocal authorizes defensive measures in
response to a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness, provided the response is
proportionate to the threat. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55
(Del. 1985).
7. Kigyo Kachi Kenkyu Kai [Corporate Value Study Group], Tekitaiteki Baishfi
Boeisaku (Kigy6 Kachi Boeisaku) no Seibi [Preparing Defensive Measures toward Hostile
Takeovers (Measures to Defend Corporate Value)] 2 (Mar. 2005), available at http://
www.meti.go.jp/committee/materials/downloadfiles/g50307a lj.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Corporate Value Study Group Report]. An English
summary of the report is available. See METI: Corporate Value Study Group, Summary
Outline of Discussion Points (Mar. 2005), available at www.meti.go.jp/english/
information/downloadfiles/Corporate%20Value.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
8. Corporate Value Study Group Report, supra note 7, at 4, 10-11, 14-20, 33
(concluding, after extended discussion of the U.S. situation, that defensive measures
recognized in U.S. and Europe can be introduced into Japan under existing corporate
law).
9. See Keizai Sangy6sh6 [Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)] &
Homush6 [Ministry of Justice], Kigyo Kachi, Kabunushi Ky6d6 no Rieki no Kakuho Mata
wa Kojo no Tame no Baishti Baeisaku ni Kansuru Shishin [Takeover Defense Guidelines
for Protecting and Enhancing Corporate Value and the Common Interests of
Shareholders] 3 (May 2005), available at http://www.meti.go.jp/press/20050527005/3-
shishinn-honntai-set.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Takeover
Guidelines] (explaining that guidelines are "modeled after typical defensive measures that
have been developed elsewhere"). An English summary of the report is available. See
METI & Ministry of Justice, Guidelines Regarding Takeover Defense for the Purposes of
Protection and Enhancement of Corporate Value and Shareholders' Common Interests
(May 2005), available at http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/ economic-oganization/pdf/
shishinhontai.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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ment may represent an epochal moment for Japan and for the global
standards movement in corporate governance.
In this Essay, I explore the emergence of hostile takeovers in Japan
as a case study in market and legal development in a global era. In its
ambitions, this Essay parallels work by prominent scholars who have
sought to explain the rise of hostile M&A and related Delaware jurispru-
dence at a formative period of U.S. corporate law development, the
1980s.10 Like those scholars, I "seek to understand the relationship be-
tween legal doctrine and the world of takeovers, and to assess the signifi-
cance of corporate law from a broader perspective."11 I do so, however,
with a very different frame of reference-Japan in the 2000s. My task is
complicated by the overlay of Delaware doctrine on a foreign legal and
economic system. Discerning the significance of Japan's emerging take-
over market and related legal developments requires nuanced compara-
tive assessments of how legal standards and governance technologies
whose evolution is deeply enmeshed with the U.S. political economy will
operate in a very different institutional setting.
Beyond the intrinsic importance of this moment for Japanese corpo-
rate governance, 12 this phenomenon bears directly on the two major de-
bates in comparative corporate governance literature today, which grap-
ple intensely with the significance and evolution of corporate law in a
global economy. One debate focuses on a provocative line of empirical
research suggesting that differences in the "origin" and "quality" of cor-
porate law among legal systems explain the diversity of corporate owner-
ship structures and capital markets around the world. 13 A second line of
debate asks whether corporate law and governance structures around the
world are converging on a U.S. shareholder-oriented model. 14 The
10. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 871 (2002);
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware
Corporate Law, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 469 (1987).
11. Kahan & Rock, supra note 10, at 872.
12. Given that the absence of a market for corporate control figures in virtually every
academic account of corporate governance in Japan, see, e.g., Fligstein, supra note 1; J.
Mark Ramseyer, Takeovers in Japan: Opportunism, Ideology and Corporate Control, 35
UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1987), the emergence of hostile takeovers may require substantial
rethinking of the entire field.
13. The seminal articles in this line of literature are the following: Rafael La Porta et
al., Law and Finance, 106 J. Pol. Econ. 1113 (1998) [hereinafter La Porta, Law and
Finance] (providing extensive empirical evidence that common law ("English origin")
systems have "higher quality" corporate law than civil law (particularly "French origin")
systems, and that greater shareholder protections in the "better" corporate law system give
rise to more dispersed share ownership structures and larger capital markets); Rafael La
Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52J. Fin. 1131 (1997) [hereinafter La
Porta et al., Legal Determinants] (arguing that countries with "poorer" investor
protections tend to have smaller capital markets).
14. Compare Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law, 89 Geo. L.J. 439 (2001) (arguing that corporate systems throughout the
world are converging on single, shareholder-oriented model), with Lucian Ayre Bebchuk
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events examined in this Essay prompt questions going to the heart of
these debates: Is Delaware law becoming a "global" standard, and if so,
what dynamics are pushing in that direction? Does the appeal of Dela-
ware corporate law lie in its superior protections for shareholders, as the
economic literature would suggest, or might the foreign gravitation to
Delaware signal something broader and more ambiguous for the conver-
gence hypothesis? How does "good" corporate law evolve anyway, 15 and
perhaps even more saliently, can it be imported from abroad? This Essay
cannot provide definitive answers to all these questions, of course. But
Japan's recent experience with hostile takeovers provides unique insights
into the significance and evolution of corporate governance in an era
when law, like capital and information, can move around the world at
great speed.
Part I of this Essay describes the rise of hostile M&A in Japan. It
begins by providing brief factual sketches of several recent contests for
control. It then explains the significance of these developments and the
immense public fascination with the transactions as the product of several
factors: the clash between old and new Japan, the novelty of the tactics
employed by the bidders, and the concerns they sparked over the rise of
"American-style" capitalism in Japan.
Part II contextualizes these deals by examining the corporate scene
in Japan from the mid-1990s to the present. The rise of hostile M&A in
Japan can be seen as the culmination of a process of interlinked market
and corporate law developments over the past decade. On the market
side are the rise of foreign institutional shareholders, steady declines in
stable and cross-shareholding patterns, and a modest but potentially sig-
nificant increase in the activism of Japanese institutional investors. The
corporate law developments include substantial changes in board govern-
ance and incentive structures, major developments in the areas of direc-
torial duties and personal liability, and expansions in organizational flexi-
bility. Not unlike the United States in the mid-1980s, by the end of this
period of substantial change,Japan's legal and market climate was condu-
cive to hostile M&A, while relatively little attention had been paid to de-
fensive measures available to target boards, setting the stage for the deal
activity and defensive maneuvering currently underway.
In Part III, I step back to interpret these developments, using analyti-
cal perspectives that have proven powerful in understanding the evolu-
tion of Delaware corporate law. In brief, I argue that when markets
changed in the 1990s, corporate law that was formerly irrelevant or com-
& Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance,
52 Stan. L. Rev. 127 (1999) (advancing theory of path dependence to explain differences
among corporate systems and to argue why these differences may persist).
15. This question is just beginning to receive the attention it deserves. See Katharina
Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. Pa. J.
Int'l Econ. L. 791 (2002) (analyzing evolution of statutory corporate law in ten countries,
and concluding that continuous evolution is the key to "good" corporate law).
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plementary to presently waning Japanese economic institutions became
problematic. Dissatisfied with the constraints imposed by law, market
participants responded as they had in the United States two decades ear-
lier: by pursuing legal strategies, adapting to governance or incentive
structures outside the legal system, and making use of the new environ-
ment to push the edges of "acceptable" market conduct, thrusting novel
transactions into the realm of contemplation, and in turn, raising new
questions that the legal system had to answer. The parallels with Dela-
ware in the 1980s are striking. In both systems, market and legal changes
reverberated through the political economy, transforming existing corpo-
rate governance institutions and catalyzing further development of the
corporate law. In contrast to developments in the United States, how-
ever, the changes in Japan involved large-scale transplantation of foreign
legal technologies and standards.
Part IV explores the implications of the foregoing analysis. For Ja-
pan, the rise of hostile takeovers presages further acceleration in the
reconfiguration of its postwar economic system. Among other possible
changes, the judiciary is likely to take on a higher profile as arbiters of
market conflict, and independent directors may assume a new role in
structuring transactions and mediating between conflicting corporate
constituencies. For comparative corporate law scholars, the Japanese
events add an important piece of empirical evidence to the ongoing theo-
retical debates about convergence, stasis, and evolution in corporate law
and governance structures. 16 At one level, the evidence provides power-
ful support for convergence theories, illustrating the intellectual appeal
of the Delaware model in the world today. But further analysis suggests
other possibilities, including a cryonic suspension of institutional transi-
tion if the poison pill proves too powerful a tool of managerial protection
in Japan's nascent shareholder movement. In all likelihood, however, the
transplantation of Delaware takeover jurisprudence and the poison pill
will lead neither to strong convergence nor to path-dependent blockage
of further reforms. Rather, preliminary evidence suggests that Delaware
law will be adapted by the judiciary and other actors to suit local inter-
ests-indeed, a struggle for the "proper" interpretation of Delaware take-
over jurisprudence in Japan is already taking shape. This struggle may
well lead to a new governance regime, but its contours may look quite
different from those in the United States.
The important dynamics at work in this Japanese experiment are
masked by the prevailing analytical constructs in the comparative corpo-
rate governance literature. In practice, successful economies do not
abandon their institutions for foreign models. Rather, foreign legal tech-
nologies are selectively adopted locally, then adapted by coalitions of
market and governmental actors to suit their own interests. The poten-
16. For a range of perspectives on this debate, see generally Convergence and
Persistence in Corporate Governance Jeffrey N. Gordon & MarkJ. Roe eds., 2004).
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tial to enhance shareholder protections is one motivation for the foreign
borrowing, but many other motivations are also at work. The result is not
so much a convergence of systems on the Anglo-American model as the
unsettling telescoping and stacking of borrowed legal institutions on top of
domestic governance structures. The true appeal of Delaware corporate
law may be its suitability to this process of selective adaptation, rather
than its superior protections for shareholders.
I. THE DEALs
The past few years have witnessed incidents of unsolicited M&A activ-
ity, which, although still small in number, are unprecedented in Japan.
This Part describes the most important recent examples. 17 To a sophisti-
cated American reader, these transactions may sound rather unremark-
able, even prosaic, particularly as compared to U.S. deal activity in the
1980s. But each of these deals is steeped in a welter of facts and circum-
stances that add a distinctly local color and significance to the transac-
tions. After sketching the essential facts, I will provide a sense of why
these deals captured the public imagination and why they appear so
important.
A. UFJ-Sumitomo
The first deal involves a contest for control involving UFJ Holdings,
the holding company for various financial institutions, including UFJ
Bank and UFJ Trust Bank (collectively, UFJ). In May 2004, UFJ signed a
memorandum of agreement to sell UFJ Trust Bank, the crown jewel of
the group, to Sumitomo Trust and its affiliated group, and to enter into a
business alliance with the two groups. The agreement provided that
Sumitomo Trust was to have the exclusive right to acquire UFJ Trust
Bank during a two-year period, and contained a standard "no shop" pro-
vision prohibiting either party from engaging in consultations or provid-
ing information to any third party in connection with a transaction that
could interfere with the deal contemplated by the memorandum. More-
over, the memorandum required each party to "negotiate in good faith
any issue that is not established in this memorandum."1 8 However, in
July 2004, with management still searching for ways out of its financial
problems, UFJ entered into talks with Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group
(MTFG) for a transaction in which the latter would acquire all of UFJ's
business operations, including UFJ Trust Bank. The merger would create
the world's largest bank on an asset basis. In the weeks following the
announcement, the stock price of Sumitomo Trust's parent corporation
17. For economy of exposition, I have pared the factual recounting of these bids to
their essentials.
18. Sumitomo Shintaku Gink6 K.K. v. Yfiefujeii Horudingusu K-K. (Sup. Ct., Aug. 30,
2004), excerpted in 1708 Sh6ji H6mu 23, 24 (2004).
20051 2177
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
dropped 14%.19 Sumitomo Trust immediately sued to enjoin the transac-
tion on the basis of the memorandum of agreement. The litigation jeop-
ardized the MTFG-UFJ merger because the Trust Bank was one of UFJ's
only profitable operations; without it, UFJ's attractiveness to MTFG would
decline significantly.
Sumitomo Trust obtained an injunction against the MTFG-UFJ nego-
tiations in the District Court on the basis of its memorandum of agree-
ment, but the High Court reversed. 20 Within hours of the High Court's
ruling on August 11, 2004, the boards of MTFG and UFJ approved a
merger of the two groups. Sumitomo Trust filed an appeal with the Su-
preme Court, and its parent company announced on August 24 that it
had just approached the UFJ board with its own bid for UFJ. Using a
tactic known in U.S. mergers and acquisitions parlance as a "bear hug,"
Sumitomo publicly announced the terms of the offer to put pressure on
the UFJ board. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court affirmed the High
Court ruling, and Sumitomo's judicial strategy reached a dead end.
Sumitomo nonetheless persevered in its pursuit of UFJ for a time, pub-
licly reserving the option to launch a hostile bid. The UFJ board, how-
ever, continued to negotiate toward a merger with MTFG, and took steps
to insulate itself from a hostile tender offer by Sumitomo.
2'
Continuously spurned by the UFJ board, Sumitomo eventually gave
up, though it filed a 100 billion yen (approximately $1 billion) lawsuit
against UFJ seeking damages for breach of the memorandum of agree-
ment. The MTFG-UFJ merger closed in the fall of 2005.
B. Livedoor-Fuji TV
The second deal involves a battle for control over Nippon Broadcast-
ing System, Inc. (Nippon Broadcasting), part of the prominent Fuji
Sankei media group. Nippon Broadcasting, a radio broadcaster, is a de
facto subsidiary of Fuji Television Network, Inc. (Fuji TV), Japan's largest
media company, and the virtual headquarters of the group. Somewhat
anomalously, however, Nippon Broadcasting held 22.5% of the outstand-
ing shares of Fuji TV, while Fuji TV held only 12.4% of Nippon Broad-
casting's shares. In part to rectify that situation, on January 17, 2005, Fuji
TV announced an all-cash offer for all of the outstanding shares of Nip-
19. Mark Saltzburg, Contest for Corporate Control Reveals Much about State of
Shareholders' Rights in Japan, IRRC Corporate Governance Bulletin, June-Sept. 2004, at
14, 17.
20. Yfiefujeii Horudingusu K.I. v. Sumitomo Shintaku Gink6 KRK. (Tokyo High Ct.,
Aug. 11, 2004), excerpted in 1708 Sh6ji H6mu 23 (2004).
21. On September 10, 2004, UFJ Bank issued a new class of preferred shares to
MTFG, giving it veto power over major business decisions by UFJ Bank. Scramble for UFJ,
Sumitomo Mitsui Seen at Dead End, Nikkei Bus., Sept. 20, 2004, available at http://




pon Broadcasting. 22 The bid was approved by the directors of Nippon
Broadcasting, with the four board members affiliated with Fuji TV
abstaining.
In the midst of the tender offer period, on February 8, 2005, an in-
ternet service provider called Livedoor (formerly called Livin' on the
Edge) made the startling announcement that it had just acquired about
9.7 million shares, or 29.6%, of Nippon Broadcasting. In combination
with shares owned previously, these purchases gave Livedoor 38% of the
shares of Nippon Broadcasting. The share purchases, which were fi-
nanced by an issuance of convertible bonds underwritten by U.S. invest-
ment bank Lehman Brothers, were made on an after-hours, off-exchange
trading system operated by the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 23 On the same
day, Livedoor informed Nippon Broadcasting of its intent to acquire all
of its outstanding shares. Livedoor's CEO, a 32-year-old college dropout
named Takafumi Horie, held a press conference to announce the ex-
pected synergies of turning Nippon Broadcasting's website into a portal
site, and his desire to enter into a business cooperation agreement with
the Fuji Sankei group.
In response, on February 23, 2005, Nippon Broadcasting announced
that its board had decided to issue warrants to Fuji TV exercisable into
47.2 million shares of Nippon Broadcasting stock. If exercised, the war-
rants would give Fuji TV majority control and dilute Livedoor's stake to
less than 20%. This type of warrant (known as shin kabu yoyaku ken), au-
thorized in a 2002 Commercial Code amendment, allows directors to is-
sue the instrument without shareholder approval at a price determined
by the board. 2 4 The Nippon Broadcasting warrants were exercisable at
5,950 yen, the price offered in Fuji TV's tender offer. Nippon Broadcast-
ing announced that the warrants were issued for the purpose of ensuring
that it remained within the Fuji Sankei group, which would provide long-
term benefits to its shareholders.
Livedoor then sued to enjoin the issuance of the warrants. The To-
kyo District Court enjoined the warrant issuance as "grossly unfair," find-
ing that its main purpose was to maintain control of the firm by incum-
22. The offer had a minimum share tender condition of the number of shares that,
when added to shares already owned by Fuji TV, would give it just over 50%.
23. Livedoor's share purchases on the after-hours system fell outside a securities
regulation requiring that any acquisition of one-third or more of the shares of a public
company be made via a tender offer open to all shareholders. Sh6ken Torihiki H6
[Securities & Exchange Act], Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-2(1), translated in Securities and
Exchange Law, Cabinet Order and Selected Ordinances: As in Effect April 1, 2001
(Capital Mkts. Research Inst. 2001). Until the Livedoor bid, this gap in the securities laws
had received scant attention.
24. Sh6h6 [Commercial Code], Law No. 48 of 1899, arts. 280-19 to 280-39, translated
in 2 EHS Law Bull. Series JA 143-54 (2004). The price determined by the board must be
"fair." Id. art. 280-21(1), translated in 2 EHS Law Bull. SeriesJA 145 (2004).
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bent management and affiliates of the Fuji Sankei group.25 The High
Court affirmed, albeit on somewhat different grounds.26 In the face of
these rulings, Nippon Broadcasting and Fuji TV abandoned the warrant
issuance. Livedoor eventually obtained a majority of the shares of Nip-
pon Broadcasting. Nippon Broadcasting's president announced his in-
tent to resign, ostensibly to shoulder the blame for "failing to protect the
company from a hostile bid."
27
In the end, the contest for Nippon Broadcasting ended civilly. On
April 18, 2005, Livedoor agreed to sell its Nippon Broadcasting shares to
Fuji TV at 6,300 yen per share, about the average price it paid for the
shares. In return, Fuji TV obtained a 12.5% stake in Livedoor for a capi-
tal infusion of approximately $440 million, and the three companies es-
tablished a joint committee to explore related ventures. 28
C. Other Examples
Other cases merit brief mention. Japan's series of hostile bids first
began in January 2000, with an unsolicited tender offer by M&A Consult-
ing, a Japanese takeover boutique, for Shoei Corporation, a company
within the Fuyo (Fuji Bank) keiretsu corporate group.29 M&A Consulting
followed the same year with a proxy fight over dividend policies at a firm
called Tokyo Style. Both attempts failed, at least in part because large
shareholders friendly to management of the target firms provided uncon-
ditional support to the incumbents.
In December 2003, Steel Partners, a U.S. buyout fund, announced
unsolicited bids for the shares of two relatively small public firms in which
it had stakes of about 10%, Yushiro Chemical Industries and Soto. The
two companies had similar financial profiles: Market prices of their
stocks were less than net asset value per share, their balance sheets
showed significant cash equivalents, and both companies had a history of
paying low dividends. Steel Partners' bid represented approximately a
30% premium over the respective stock price of both target firms over
25. See Raibudoa K.K. v. Nippon H6sO KK., 1173 Hanrei Taimuzu 140, 141-42
(Tokyo D. Ct., Mar. 16, 2003).
26. See Nippon H6s6 KR v. Raibudoa KK., 1173 Hanrei Taimuzu 125, 132-33
(Tokyo High Ct., Mar. 23, 2005); see also infra text accompanying note 73.
27. Nippon H6s6: Kamebuchi Shach6 no Tainin N6k6 ni Baishfi B6shi Dekizu Inseki
[Nippon Broadcasting: Increased [Likelihood that] President Kamebuchi Will Resign for
Failing to Prevent Takeover], Mainichi Shimbun, Apr. 9, 2005, available at http://www.
mainichi-msn.co.jp/shakai/wadai/news/20050409k0000e040024000c.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
28. Fuji, Raibudoa to Wakai [Fuji and Livedoor Settle], Asahi Shimbun, Apr. 19, 2005,
at 1.
29. There were also two foreign bids in 2000: Britain's Cable & Wireless acquired
Japanese telecom International Digital Communications (IDC) in an unsolicited bid after
IDC had accepted a stock swap with Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Corp., and German
pharmaceutical maker Boehringer Ingelheim made a successful unsolicited bid for a
blocking stake in SS Pharmaceuticals.
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the preceding month. Management of both Japanese firms immediately
announced their opposition to the tender offers, and as a defensive mea-
sure, significantly changed their dividend policies. As a result, share
price increased, and shareholders did not tender into the bids.
Most recently, in July 2005, Yumeshin Holdings launched a hostile
tender offer for Japan Engineering Consultants. The target board took a
number of defensive steps, including a stock split to exploit legal uncer-
tainty over the bidder's ability to adjust its offer price in the midst of a
tender offer and announcement of a warrant issuance designed to func-
tion like a poison pill. Yumeshin challenged the validity of these mea-
sures in court, but the offer failed in any event, because Japan Engineer-
ing's stock price rose substantially above Yumeshin's offer price, and few
shareholders tendered into the bid.
30
D. Significance
It would be difficult to overstate the attention these deals-particu-
larly the Livedoor bid-received in Japan, despite their small numbers
and the fact that none ended entirely successfully for the bidders. With-
out discounting the role of colorful facts in the prominence of these
transactions, 3 1 these contests struck a deep chord in the Japanese con-
sciousness-not only on a corporate level, but politically and socially as
well. Several closely related factors help explain this phenomenon. First,
these deals are an allegory on old versus new Japan. Livedoor is an in-
ternet firm run by a young college dropout in T-shirt and jeans, who had
made a name, and a billion dollars, for himself buying up small technol-
ogy companies. The target of his latest ambition was a radio broadcaster
in a bloated media conglomerate, steered by starched-shirted sixty-some-
things. UFJ, a large, weak bank formed through the merger of three
smaller, weak banks, is quite literally a product of old Japan-a legacy of
an era in which banks lent funds on the basis of relationships rather than
financial analysis, and in which regulators quietly brokered mergers to re-
equilibrate markets. M&A Consulting and Steel Partners, the bidders in
the other transactions, represent a new breed of investor in Japanese mar-
kets-"vulture" and other strategic funds seeking to generate high finan-
cial returns by taking large stakes in distressed or undervalued firms.
Second, the market players in these deals used previously unheard-of
tactics to achieve their objectives. M&A Consulting's use of the proxy
fight, Sumitomo's bear hug, Livedoor's unsolicited bid, not to mention
the strategic use of litigation in the contests for UFJ and Nippon Broad-
30. Michael Tsang & Eijiro Ueno, Japan Engineering Aims to Thwart Bid, Int'l Herald
Trib., Aug. 1, 2005, at 15.
31. For example, in the midst of the contest for Nippon Broadcasting, several
celebrities who appear on Fuji TV programs announced that they would resign rather than
work for an enterprise controlled by Livedoor. Court Hands Victory to Livedoor, Japan
Zone, Mar. 24, 2005, at http://www.japan-zone.com/news/archives/2005-03.shtml (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
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casting, all marked major departures from the norm in the world ofJapa-
nese takeovers. As such, they generated a welter of controversy by creat-
ing the impression that a new brand of "American" capitalism was
infiltrating Japan. 32 In the midst of Livedoor's hostile bid for Nippon
Broadcasting, for example, Fuji TV's chairman remarked, "I wonder if
this sort of thing is called American style. I don't know it because I'm
Japanese. '33 More reflective commentators have questioned whether Ja-
pan is ready for the wholesale introduction of the U.S. system of corpo-
rate governance, with its extensive reliance on freedom of contract, ro-
bust capital markets, ex post judicial review, and private enforcement
backed by a welter of incentives.3 4 Some view hostile bids as part of the
standard corporate governance tool kit, with potential to help revive the
Japanese economy by moving assets to their most productive uses; others
see an undesirable foreign practice that is inconsistent with Japanese sen-
sibilities, and subject to exploitation in Japan's comparatively underdevel-
oped corporate and capital markets regime.
35
Closely related to the impression made by the tactical novelty of
these transactions is the larger sense (whether genuine or strategically
motivated) that corporate Japan is now vulnerable to a wave of foreign
acquisitions.3 6 For years, a significant percentage of public firms in Japan
32. See, e.g., Jason Singer, With '80s Tactics, U.S. Fund Shakes Japan's Cozy
Capitalism, Wall St.J., Apr. 15, 2004, atAl (discussing New York investment fund's hostile
takeover bids for two Japanese companies and noting that accompanying "uproar signals
the arrival in Japan of American-style capitalism and the loud voice it gives shareholders").
33. Takuya Karube, Livedoor Ushers in Era of Hostile Takeover, Japan Today, Feb.
24, 2005, available at http://www.japantoday.com/e/?content=comment&id=731 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
34. See Tatsuo Uemura, Raibudoa tai Fuji Terebi: Shijo no Rfiru wo Fumiarasu Mono
wa Dare ka? [Livedoor v. Fuji TV: Who Will Trample the Market Rules?], Sekai, May 2005,
at 58 (using Livedoor case to argue that Japan lacks enforcement and market infrastructure
necessary to make introduction of U.S. system work properly).
35. Opinion surveys taken during the Livedoor-Fuji contest generally show support
for Livedoor's Horie and his tactics as well as approval of the court decision invalidating
Nippon Broadcasting's defensive warrant issuance. See 2005 Nen Tei Rei Yoron Ch6sa, 3
Gatsu [March 2005 Public Opinion Survey] (Mar. 2005), available at http://
www.ntv.co.jp/yoron/2005-03/200503/question.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review). But perhaps unsurprisingly, Horie received intense criticism among business and
political leaders. For example, Hiroshi Okuda, the chairman of Keidanren (Federation of
Economic Organizations) -Japan's big business lobby-and also head of Toyota, said of
Horie, "He has been criticized by people in politics and business circles for having done
something morally wrong, because it is the worst thing in Japanese society to think that if
you have money, you can do anything." Takuya Karube, Young Gun Under Fire for
Takeover Bid, Japan Times, Feb. 8, 2005, available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/getarticle.p15?nb20050225a3.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also
Uemura, supra note 34.
36. This perception is propagated even in official policy papers. See, e.g., H6mush6
Minji Ky6ku (Ministry of Justice, Civil Affairs Department], Kigy6 Baishfs B6eisaku ni
Tsuite [On Corporate Takeover Defenses] 1 (undated policy outline) (justifying its policy
initiative on the ground that "because of an increase in the desire of foreign firms to
acquire Japanese companies ... it is necessary to develop reasonable takeover defenses in
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have traded below their asset values, 37 and the market capitalization of
major Japanese firms is often only a fraction as large as that of their U.S.
peers. This anxiety bubbled to the surface even during the Livedoor con-
test, though all the principal players were Japanese. Much critical atten-
tion in media and government circles was focused on Lehman Brothers'
role in financing Livedoor's bid. Keidanren, a powerful big business
lobby, issued policy papers calling for Japan's business community to de-
vise measures to deter "foreign predators." In response to these anxie-
ties, in the midst of the contest for Nippon Broadcasting, the Japanese
government postponed a planned corporate law amendment that would
permit foreign firms to do cross-border acquisitions in Japan using trian-
gular mergers and stock swaps, even though hostile acquisitions are not
feasible via this mechanism. 38 As Europe has illustrated in its ongoing
and contentious debate over the Thirteenth Directive, 39 crafting an offi-
cial response to hostile takeovers touches deep chords of nationalism,
protectionism, and fear of the unknown. These forces are also at work in
Japan.
Perhaps most importantly, these contests for control have brought
Japanese corporate governance into uncharted territory. The emergence
of a market for corporate control in Japan, if only nascent, has the poten-
tial to significantly change the incentive structure for Japanese managers.
Surveys taken in the wake of the Livedoor bid indicate that managers at
70% of large Japanese firms are concerned about the "threat" of hostile
takeovers. 40 Previously, Japanese managers had few direct incentives,
short of financial crisis, to take major steps to enhance the value of their
firms.4 1 If they are no longer secure from the threat of hostile acquisition
order to cope with acquisitions that will have an adverse effect on regional employment
and harm the interests of existing shareholders").
37. Indeed, lists of such firms appear occasionally in the business press. See, e.g.,
Masatoshi Kikuchi, TOB Sareyasui Kigy6 25sha [25 Firms Ripe for Takeover],
Ekonomisuto, Mar. 14, 2000, at 60, 61.
38. The political dimensions of this action are readily apparent in the fact that the
U.S. embassy in Tokyo spearheaded a public education campaign in Japan to combat the
fear of foreign takeovers following the Livedoor bid. See Excerpts of Message from the
U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, Japan, Foreign Direct Investment and Revitalizing Japan's
Economy Through Mergers & Acquisitions (2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
39. The Thirteenth Directive, which would have severely limited the ability of
European firms to adopt defensive measures against hostile bids, failed to pass in 2001
after Germany withdrew its support out of concern for the vulnerability of German firms to
foreign takeover. It was subsequently resuscitated, but only through inclusion of
reciprocity provisions to allay protectionist concerns. Jeffrey N. Gordon, An American
Perspective on Anti-Takeover Laws in the EU: The German Example, in Reforming
Company and Takeover Law in Europe 541, 556 (Guido Ferrarini et al. eds., 2004).
40. See, e.g., Tekitaiteki Baishfi, "Ky6i" 7 Wari [Seventy Percent [Perceive] "Threat" of
Hostile Takeover], Asahi Shimbun, Apr. 30, 2005, at 1.
41. See Chuck Lucier et al., Why CEOs Fall: The Causes and Consequences of
Turnover at the Top, Strategy + Bus., Third Quarter 2002, at 1, 13 (reprint 2002), available
at http://exfile.bah.com/livelink/livelink/110173/?func=doc.Fetch&nodeid=110173 (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (showing that Japanese CEOs have "lowest proportions
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or other unwelcome shareholder advances, they ignore shareholder re-
turns at considerable peril to their own futures. Though the number of
unsolicited bids is still very low by any measure and no bid thus far has
been an unqualified success, the trend is upward, and it is not the num-
ber, but the existence, of hostile bids that matters from a corporate gov-
ernance perspective.
II. THE DEAL ENVIRONMENT
Why has the phenomenon of hostile M&A begun to appear at this
moment in Japanese economic history? Answering this question requires
contextualizing the contests for control just described within broader
market and legal changes in Japan over the past decade.
The rise of hostile M&A activity is part of a series of trends taking
root in Japanese corporate governance, driven by deep structural changes
in the economy following the bursting of Japan's bubble economy in
1990. These interrelated developments have combined to create a corpo-
rate governance environment that differs in significant respects from the
one characterizing postwarJapan. First, the composition of shareholders,
patterns of share ownership, and activism of shareholders in Japan have
evolved substantially. Figure 1 shows several significant trends.42 Share-
holding by financial institutions has declined from almost 43% of market
capitalization in the early 1990s to less than 35% as of 2004. More signifi-
candy, within this group, shareholding by commercial banks has declined
precipitously, from almost 16% in 1992 to less than 6% in 2004. Corpo-
rate share ownership has declined from about 29% to about 22% over the
same period. Significantly, these declines in Japanese institutional share
ownership have been completely offset by increases in foreign ownership,
which rose from about 6% of market capitalization in 1992 to almost 22%
in 2004. Virtually all of these shares are held by foreign institutional in-
vestors, including CalPERS and other funds known for active engagement
with the managements of their portfolio firms.
Equally importantly, shareholding patterns have changed. Time se-
ries data presented in Figure 2 show steep declines in cross-shareholding
and stable shareholding between the early 1990s and 2002.4 3 On a value
of merger-driven and performance-related departures; the smallest impact of CEO
performance upon tenure; the oldest CEOs at ascension; and the least orientation toward
shareholder returns" of CEOs in United States, Europe, and Asia/Pacific region).
42. Data in this figure are from Tokyo Stock Exch., Fact Book 2005, at 60 (2005),
available at http://www.tse.or.jp/english/data/factbook/fact-book_2005.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
43. Data in this figure are from Fumio Kuroki, NLI Research, The Relationship of
Companies and Banks as Cross-Shareholdings Unwind-Fiscal 2002 Cross-Shareholding
Survey 6 & fig.3 (2003), available at http://www.nli-research.co.jp/eng/resea/econo/
eco03lll8.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Recently, two scholars have argued
that the patterns of stable and cross-shareholding (along with other institutions such as the
main bank system and keiretsu corporate groups) thought to characterize postwarJapanese
corporate governance are actually artifacts of data-mining and urban legend. See Yoshiro
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basis, the cross-shareholding ratio has declined by more than 10% over
this period. The decline is attributable not only to unwinding of cross-
shareholding arrangements, but also to the public listing of new compa-
nies that do not rely on long-term shareholding arrangements. The long-
term shareholding ratio has declined by almost 20% over this period.
Japanese institutional investors and corporate shareholders have also
become more activist, at least in comparison to the past. As recently as
five years ago, banks, institutional investors, and stable corporate share-
holders could be counted on to give unconditional support to manage-
ment in the event an unwelcome bidder appeared. 44 That is no longer
the case. Most visibly, several public retirement plan sponsors collectively
managing over $1 trillion in assets have recently established proxy voting
guidelines that emphasize corporate governance considerations, and
have taken other steps to raise their profile vis-.A-vis boards of directors.
45
Miwa &J. Mark Ramseyer, The Myth of the Main Bank, 27 Law & Soc. Inquiry 401, 420-21
(2002). I address that argument elsewhere. See Curtis J. Milhaupt, On the (Fleeting)
Existence of the Main Bank and Other Japanese Economic Institutions, 27 Law & Soc.
Inquiry 425, 436 (2002) (arguing that Miwa and Ramseyer's theory "is not supported with
compelling data and has little explanatory power with respect to changes in Japanese
economic performance and organization over the past several decades").
44. Two hostile bids launched by a Japanese takeover boutique in 2000 failed in part
for this reason. See supra text accompanying note 29.
45. For example, the Japanese Pension Fund Association (PFA), which directly
oversees the management of substantial retirement assets and serves as the industry
association for all pension fund managers, promulgated proxy voting principles in 2003
with recommendations on appropriate board size, separation of the offices of CEO and
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Adding momentum to this trend is the rising prospect of liability for fail-
ure to make decisions in the interests of shareholders. 46 It is no longer
considered acceptable for the board of a large corporate or institutional
investor to support incumbent management of a portfolio firm regardless
of the financial consequences to their own shareholders.
Second, board structure and managerial incentives have been al-
tered to the point that today two different board systems-colloquially, a
'Japanese" board and a "U.S." board-compete within the economy. In
an effort to enhance the effectiveness of the board, beginning in the mid-
1990s many companies began to consider reducing the size of the board
and including outside directors. 47 Of the firms reducing the size of the
board, 80% scaled back to fewer than ten directors. About 25% of listed
Chairman, compensation practices, and other corporate governance issues. With respect
to mergers and spinoffs, the guidelines recommend valuations by neutral and independent
third parties. The PFA has also taken a lead in voting against or abstaining from proxy
votes supported by management. See Tomomi Yano, Pension Fund Ass'n, Corporate
Governance Activities of Pension Fund Association 10-15, at http://www.usajapan.org/
PDF/TYanoA1l04.ppt (last visited Aug. 8, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
Proxy voting has become one of the major criteria by which plan sponsors select fund
managers.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 53-56.
47. Survey data show an increase in firms displaying interest in reducing the number
of directors, from 28.6% in 1998 to 46.2% in 2000. Tokyo Stock Exch., Survey on Listed
Companies' Corporate Governance 2, 4, 7, 10 (Nov. 30, 2000), available at http://
www.tse.or.jp/english/news/2001/200102/010221-a.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
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firms have appointed outside directors to their boards, and the number
continues to increase.48 A major overhaul of the Commercial Code in
2002 allows firms to opt out of the traditional board structure featuring a
"statutory auditor" in favor of a U.S.-style committee system for corporate
governance. 49 In lieu of statutory auditors, firms can establish board
committees for the audit, nomination, and compensation functions. A
majority of the members of each committee must be outside directors.
For firms choosing the committee system, a related amendment creates a
formal distinction between directors, bearing oversight responsibility but
not day-to-day managerial functions, and executive officers who actually
run the firm. 50 These reforms are designed to strengthen the supervisory
role of the board and to enhance the separation of monitoring and deci-
sionmaking functions.
In line with these attempts to make management more responsive,
executive compensation arrangements are being reformed. Traditional,
seniority-based compensation is gradually giving way to performance-
based pay arrangements. As of 2004, 46% of large firms either had al-
ready eliminated seniority-based pay for managers or planned to do so.
5a
As a percentage of total compensation, variable pay (stock options, bo-
nuses, and the like) increased from 21% to 33% from 1996 to 2003, and
the portion of variable pay consisting of stock options went from zero to
20% over that period.5 2 At least potentially, these reforms may make Jap-
anese managers somewhat less resistant to unsolicited bids if they benefit
48. Hugh Patrick, Evolving Corporate Governance in Japan 25 (Ctr. on Japanese
Econ. & Bus., Working Paper No. 220, 2004) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). It is
important to note, however, that the definition of outside director in Japan is more
expansive than that in the United States, encompassing directors affiliated with a parent
firm or sibling subsidiary. See Shoh6 [Commercial Code], Law No. 48 of 1899, art. 188,
translated in 2 EHS Law Bull. SeriesJA 49-50 (2004).
49. Law for Special Exceptions to the Commercial Code Concerning Audit, etc. of
Kabushiki-Kaisha [Joint Stock Companies], Law No. 22 of 1974, art. 21-5 to 21-39,
translated in 2 EHS Bull. Series JAA 17-41 (2004). Statutory auditors (kansayaku)
comprise a board parallel to the board of directors, and are responsible for overseeing the
directors' compliance with law and the corporation's certificate of incorporation. They
have the right to investigate the corporation's books and affairs and to demand that
directors cease unlawful activity. See Shoho [Commercial Code], arts. 273-280, translated
in 2 EHS Law Bull. Series JA 130-54 (2004).
50. See Law for Special Exceptions to the Commercial Code Concerning Audit, etc. of
Kabushiki-Kaisha [Joint Stock Companies], arts. 21-5, 21-15, translated in 2 EHS Law Bull.
Series JAA 20, 30 (2004). Previously, there was no legal distinction between directors and
officers, although beginning in the late 1990s companies began to informally make the
distinction by creating an executive officer (shikko yakuin) position for executives who did
not simultaneously serve on the board.
51. Keisho Komoto, NLI Research, Companies Make Progress in Reforming
Employment and Wage Systems-February 2004 Nissay Business Conditions Survey 9 fig.8
(May 2004), available at http://crystal.nli-research.co.jp/eng/resea/econo/ecoO4O5l2.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
52. Towers Perrin, Worldwide Total Remuneration Report 2003-2004, at 26 (2003)
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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directly from resulting share price increases. Thus far, however, Japanese
executive compensation arrangements do not contain lucrative change-
of-control provisions common in the United States.
Finally, the legal environment for director decisionmaking has
changed, placing directors under considerably greater scrutiny from
shareholders and courts. In the past several years, Japanese courts have
rendered decisions with striking parallels to important Delaware court
decisions. Greater resort to shareholder derivative litigation since the
early 1990s has created new law clarifying the legal responsibilities of di-
rectors to their firms. 53 A good example of this process is the share-
holder litigation involving Daiwa Bank. In that case, shareholders of the
bank derivatively sued eleven current and former directors for failing to
detect and accurately report to U.S. authorities massive unauthorized
trading in the bank's New York branch that ultimately resulted in almost
$1.5 billion in losses and fines. The directors, heeding an informal Minis-
try of Finance indication that disclosure of the losses to the Federal Re-
serve would be untimely given instability in the Japanese financial system,
filed a misleading report with the U.S. banking regulators, a violation of
U.S. federal law. The Osaka District Court held the defendants liable for
breach of duty and ordered them to pay $775 million in damages. 54 The
court dismissed the argument that the Ministry of Finance's informal gui-
dance should insulate the directors from liability. The court remarked
that the "defendant [directors] persisted in following local rules that ap-
ply only in Japan, despite the fact that the Japanese economy has ex-
panded on a global scale." 55 In finding the directors liable for failing to
establish a risk management system designed to detect employee miscon-
duct, the case has obvious parallels to the Caremark decision of the Dela-
ware Chancery Court.
5 6
To sum up, the market environment for Japanese corporate govern-
ance as well as the corporate law itself have changed significantly over the
past ten years. In the fundamental areas of board structure, directorial
duties and personal liability, executive compensation, and organizational
flexibility, both statutory and case law have changed markedly, paving the
way for new types of transactions in Japan. While these legal develop-
53. See Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan, 30J. Legal
Stud. 351, 356 & tbl.1 (documenting dramatic increase in shareholder litigation in 1990s).
54. See Nishimura v. Abekawa (The Daiwa Bank Case), 1573 Sh6ji HOmu 4, 4 (Osaka
D. Ct., Sept. 20, 2000).
55. Id. at 46.
56. See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996)
("[A] director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a
corporate information and reporting system . . . exists, and that failure to do so under
some circumstances may . . . render a director liable for losses caused by non-compliance
with applicable legal standards."). For a discussion of the parallels to Delaware case law,
see Bruce E. Aronson, Reconsidering the Importance of Law in Japanese Corporate
Governance: Evidence from the Daiwa Bank Shareholder Derivative Case, 36 Cornell Int'l
LJ. 11, 33-36 (2003).
2188 [Vol. 105:2171
DELAWARE'S SHADOW
ments in themselves are not sufficient to drive merger activity, they have
altered the incentive environment for transfers of corporate control, facil-
itating deals motivated by Japan's new economic realities.
Also significant, however, is what did not change in this period.
While the market and legal developments just described created a climate
much more conducive to transfers of corporate assets, including poten-
tially through unsolicited bids, virtually no attention was paid to the de-
velopment of new defensive mechanisms to replace the gradually dwin-
dling postwar tactics of cross-shareholding arrangements and business
alliances. Thus, as Japan entered the 2000s, changes in the environment
left managers rather exposed-not unlike their American counterparts in
the mid-1980s. Not surprisingly, contests for corporate control emerged
in both environments.
III. LEGAL STRATEGIES AND ADAPTATION
As we have seen, substantial market shifts and large-scale legal devel-
opment occurred over the course of a decade, in a country commonly
portrayed as slow to change, 57 culminating in a series of hostile bids that
would have seemed unthinkable a short time ago. But these develop-
ments were not random or completely exogenous, any more than the rise
of hostile M&A and related jurisprudence in the United States was a ran-
dom or exogenous event. In this Part, I uncover the underlying dynamics
that propelled Japan to this remarkable moment in its economic and in-
stitutional development, drawing parallels to events in the United States
two decades earlier.
To help interpret the changes in Japan, I consciously draw on analy-
tical templates that have proven powerful in understanding the develop-
ment of Delaware takeover jurisprudence. For example, in the Delaware
context, Professors Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock have argued that
market participants dissatisfied with the state of the law can pursue three
different strategies: They can seek to change the law through the legisla-
tive or judicial process; they can opt out of the disfavored legal regime
either by changing a company's organic governance documents or by re-
incorporating in another jurisdiction; or they can adapt by changing gov-
ernance or incentive structures external to the legal regime, such as
board structure or compensation. 58 In an early and influential article,
Professors Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller argued that "Delaware
law reflects an internal equilibrium among competing interest groups."59
That is, Delaware corporate law, prominently including its takeover law,
57. See, e.g., Asia's So Slow Express, Economist, Nov. 4, 2000, at 75 (describing
economic recovery in Japan as a "long slog"); EdwardJ. Lincoln, Arthritic Japan: The Slow
Pace of Economic Reform 1 (Japan Policy Research Inst., Working Paper No. 81, Oct.
2001) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (concluding thatJapan's "economic system is
not changing very much").
58. Kahan & Rock, supra note 10, at 887-93.
59. Macey & Miller, supra note 10, at 509.
20051 2189
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
can be best understood as the outcome of political bargaining among
interest groups, including managers, shareholders, corporate advisors,
and state legislators. Combining these approaches, the evolution of cor-
porate law can be seen as a product of strategic adaptation to new market
realities, shaped by interest-group dynamics. This analytical approach is
not system-specific, and it provides a powerful way of viewing the past
decade of corporate law development in Japan.
A. Legal Strategies
As is apparent from the preceding discussion, legal strategies focused
on the corporate law became prevalent in Japan over the past decade as
one way of dealing with Japan's economic problems, leading to an almost
annual series of amendments to the Commercial Code. These amend-
ments lifted restrictions on equity finance and stock options, relaxed a
ban on holding companies, streamlined merger procedures, and ex-
panded shareholder monitoring mechanisms such as the derivative suit.
The accelerated pace and expanded scope of corporate law amendments
represent a major departure from past practice, in which amendments
were made at a highly deliberate pace and were typically driven by scan-
dals or other exogenous shocks, rather than by organized interests or gov-
ernment actors pursuing responses to the exigencies of the market.
60
The move to legal strategies follows the simple logic of the political
economy. In the postwar high-growth period fueled by bank loans and
retained earnings, Code restrictions on equity finance techniques, stock
options, and organizational form had little impact on Japanese economic
activity. Indeed, the Code's relatively mechanical, rule-oriented ap-
proach may have actually complemented Japan's small judiciary and ac-
counting profession. 6 1 However, as the economy stalled in the 1990s and
60. Mark D. West, The Puzzling Divergence of Corporate Law: Evidence and
Explanations from Japan and the United States, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 527, 587-88 (2001)
[hereinafter West, Puzzling Divergence] ("[C]orporate law development proceeded not in
accordance with a broad plan, either of government, managers, investors, or any other
interest group.... Instead, development in Japan is best described as slow and reactionary
to various exogenous phenomena.").
61. Hideki Kanda & Tomotaka Fujita, Kabushiki Kaisha H6 no Tokushitsu, Tay6sei,
Henka [Features, Variety, and Evolution of Stock Corporation Statutes], in Kaisha H6 no
Keizaigaku [Economic Analysis of Corporate Law] 453, 470-75 (Yoshiro Miwa et al. eds.,
1998). By contrast, in the United States, flexible and permissive corporate laws
complement a fairly robust financial disclosure regime and an expansive legal system,
featuring a large legal profession, a judiciary comfortable with the application of broad
standards as opposed to narrow rules, and a procedural environment replete with
procedural mechanisms to promote private litigation as a tool of enforcement. See, e.g.,
William Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American Corporate
Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 953, 976 (2003) ("Delaware takes an enabling approach, which broadly
empowers corporate boards acting in conformity with their fiduciary duties to cause their




many corporations were in need of restructuring, market participants rec-
ognized that the Code's constraints were blocking needed reforms. Since
then, the business community, working through its political allies in the
ruling Liberal Democratic Party, has had a much larger voice in the cor-
porate law reform process. Stock options are the first illustration of the
move to legal strategies. The success of Silicon Valley's venture capital
industry drew envious glances from the Japanese, whose own venture cap-
ital market was inhibited by a variety of legal rigidities. 62 For example,
Commercial Code restrictions made the issuance of stock options impos-
sible as a practical matter. This limitation prompted an unprecedented
reform of the Commercial Code in 1997 to liberalize the stock option
regime-unprecedented because, for the first time in postwar history, an
amendment was initiated by politicians rather than bureaucrats working
through the Legislative Reform Council, as the business community pre-
vailed upon Diet members to bypass the traditional, ponderous amend-
ment process.
63
Simultaneously, some market actors adapted informally to perceived
deficiencies in the legal regime. In 1997, Sony started a trend by drasti-
cally reducing the size of its board and creating the position of executive
officer, which was not recognized in the Commercial Code. These moves
were intended to increase the functionality of the board as a monitoring
and strategic decisionmaking organ. These changes also had an impor-
tant strategic legal consequence: Because the position of executive of-
ficer was entirely informal, individuals holding that position were not
proper defendants of shareholder derivative litigation. Thus, Sony's
move was highly instrumental in that it shielded an important class of
managers from legal liability. This innovation was quickly mimicked by
hundreds of other firms. 64 Eventually the position of executive officer
was codified in the corporate law, and executive officers became subject
to derivative suits.
As the discussion of Sony suggests, as in the United States, some mar-
ket actors in Japan opted out of the disfavored regime. However, strate-
gies based on opting out unfold differently in the Japanese context be-
cause Japan has a unitary corporate law structure. Thus, unlike the
situation in the United States, it is not possible to reincorporate in ajuris-
diction with more favorable rules. Other scholars have suggested that the
62. Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan:
Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev.
865, 880-90 (1997).
63. Hideki Kanda, Understanding Recent Trends Regarding the Liability of Managers
and Directors in Japanese Corporate Law, J.Japanese L., vol. 9, No. 17, 2004, at 29, 32-33,
available at http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/anjel/documents/ZJapanR/ZJapanR-17-07-
Kanda.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
64. See Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution of Nonlegal
Rules in Japanese Corporate Governance, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2083, 2117 & n.117 (2001)




monopoly on corporate charters causes the process of corporate law re-
form in Japan to differ from that in the United States, where competition
for charters promotes swift, endogenously induced reform.65 However,
the 2002 reform giving Japanese firms the option of retaining their tradi-
tional board structure or switching to a U.S.-style board with independent
committees can be understood as an adaptive response to the inability to
opt out of the unitary regime. Japanese firms cannot reincorporate from
one prefecture to another, but they can now obtain some measure of
choice by selecting the board structure deemed to best suit the firm's
characteristics. 66 To the extent thatJapanese firms now have a choice of
board structure, Japan has introduced a measure of quasi-jurisdictional
charter competition into its corporate law.
The result of the decade's amendments is a much more flexible,
deal-friendly corporate law. Merger activity of all kinds has increased sig-
nificantly in Japan over the past ten years. For example, the number of
mergers and acquisitions increased from about 500 per year in the 1990s
to 2,211 in 2004.6 7 Japanese merger activity was approximately 0.4% of
GDP in 1990. By 2002, it was 5.5% of GDP.68 Economic necessity ulti-
mately drove both the legal changes and the increased merger activity,
but these data indicate that Japanese market actors responded predict-
ably and significantly to adjustments in their institutional environment.
B. Court Action
More transactions, some of which were promoted by actors such as
Livedoor's Horie, who pushed the envelope of accepted market conduct,
created new opportunities to pursue legal strategies through the courts.
We have already seen an important byproduct of the dramatic increase in
derivative litigation in Japan over the past decade-the creation of judi-
cial rulings amplifying the duties of directors. Litigation initiated by bid-
ders frustrated by a target management's defensive measures was not
completely unknown in Japan. However, the standard that emerged
from the sparse litigation-that a share issuance to a white knight may be
set aside as "grossly unfair" if the primary purpose of the issuance is dilu-
65. West, Puzzling Divergence, supra note 60, at 589-91.
66. RonaldJ. Gilson & CurtisJ. Milhaupt, Choice as Regulatory Reform: The Case of
Japanese Corporate Governance, 53 Am. J. Comp. L. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript on
file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=537843.
67. Kigy6 Kachi Kenkyai Kai [Corporate Value Study Group], Kigy6 Kachi H6koku
Sho [Corporate Value Report] 13 (May 2005), available at http://www.meti.go.jp/press/
20050527005/3-houkokusho-honntai-set.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Corporate Value Report].
68. Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, Institutional Change and M&A in Japan, in




tion of the bidder's stake in the target 6 9-did not constitute a particularly
complete or instructive body of takeover jurisprudence. With so few
deals, the courts had little opportunity, or need, to flesh out the stan-
dards governing these transactions.
This situation has begun to change. Sumitomo's bid for UFJ and
Livedoor's bid for Nippon Broadcasting have generated important pieces
of the emerging body of Japanese takeover jurisprudence. As noted
above, Sumitomo Trust sought a temporary restraining order on the basis
of its memorandum of understanding with UFJ. The District Court
granted the order, but the High Court reversed on the ground that the
"bond of trust between Sumitomo Trust and UFJ was already destroyed,
and so it is impossible to expect that they will continue to negotiate in
good faith towards conclusion of a definitive agreement."70 The Su-
preme Court affirmed, on narrower grounds. It held that a temporary
restraining order was not appropriate because monetary damages could
adequately compensate Sumitomo Trust for any harm it sustained in con-
nection with the loss of the possibility, which the court found to be fairly
small, of reaching a final agreement with UFJ.7 1 Also noteworthy about
this case is what the courts did not decide. None of the three opinions
generated in the case grappled with the corporate law issue of the duties
of UFJ directors in deciding between the MTFG and Sumitomo bids.
In the Livedoor litigation, the court was forced to decide a question at
the heart of any takeover law: When is it permissible for a target's board
to erect a virtually impenetrable barrier to an unsolicited bid? The Dis-
trict Court enjoined Nippon Broadcasting's warrant issuance as "grossly
unfair" and the High Court affirmed, 72 enunciating the following rule:
In principle, where a contest for corporate control has emerged,
it constitutes a grossly unfair issuance (Commercial Code arts.
280-39(4), 280-10) to issue warrants, the primary purpose of
which is for existing management or a specific shareholder who
exercises actual influence over management to maintain con-
trol, by diluting the holdings of another shareholder who has
made a hostile bid .... However, where the hostile bidder (1)
simply intends to make a target company or its affiliates repur-
chase the shares for a premium after the stock price increases (is
69. See Shtiwa K.K. v. K.K Chcijitsuya, 1317 HanreiJih6 28, 32 (Tokyo D. Ct.,July 25,
1989); see also Sh~h6 [Commercial Code], Law No. 48 of 1899, art. 280-10, translated in 2
EHS Law Bull. Series JA 140 (2004).
70. Yfiefujeii Horudingusu K.K v. Sumitomo Shintaku Gink6 K.K. (Tokyo High Ct.,
Aug. 11, 2004), excerpted in 1708 Shji H6mu 23, 23 (2004).
71. Sumitomo Shintaku Gink6 K. v. Yfiefujeii Horudingusu K& (Sup. Ct., Aug. 30,
2004), excerpted in 1708 Shji H6mu 23, 24 (2004). Sumitomo Trust subsequently filed
suit against UFJ, seeking 100 billion yen (approximately $1 billion) in damages for breach
of contract. If at First You Don't Succeed... : Sumitomo Trust Still Not Done Suing UFJ,
Asahi Shimbun, Oct. 29, 2004, available at http://www.asahi.com/english/business/
TKY200410290128.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
72. See Nippon H~s6 K.K. v. Raibudoa KK, 1173 Hanrei Taimuzu 125 (Tokyo High
Ct., Mar. 23, 2005).
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engaged in so-called greenmail), (2) intends to transfer intellec-
tual property, know-how, corporate secrets, key business transac-
tions or customers, which are vital for the management of the
company, to the bidder or its affiliates (is engaged in "scorched
earth" policies), (3) has acquired shares so that after acquiring
control, the bidder can use the target's assets to secure or pay
off bidder's debts or those of related companies, or (4) obtains
temporary control of management to sell off assets not directly
related to the core business, such as real estate or securities, in
order to pay a one-time dividend from the proceeds, or to sell
off the stock after having driven up the stock price due to the
high dividend-in other words, where there is an abusive motive
of exploiting the target, then the hostile bidder need not be
protected as a shareholder, and because it is clear that the inter-
ests of other shareholders will be harmed if the bidder is left to
its own devices, issuance of warrants whose primary purpose is to
preserve or protect management's control rights may be permit-
ted to the extent the means of resistance are recognized as nec-
essary and appropriate.
73
Finding insufficient evidence that any of these abusive motives were pre-
sent in Livedoor's bid, the High Court concluded that Nippon Broadcast-
ing's board had issued the warrants with the primary purpose of preserv-
ing management's control. Accordingly, the court enjoined the issuance.
Note the Unocal-like qualities of the rule set out by the High Court,
with its implicit threat analysis and proportionality requirement. This
may not be coincidental. The courts in this case had been briefed on
how the issue would be resolved under Delaware law, and the recent take-
over contests in Japan generated a large body of academic commentary
on how a Revlon or Unocal rule in Japan would have applied in the
cases.
7 4
As in the United States, judicial decisions clarifying directors' legal
duties reverberate through the political economy, at times provoking
countermoves by threatened groups. A close parallel to the famous Van
73. Id. at 132-33. Note the parallel to the early Cheff case in Delaware, in which the
court's first attempt to fashion a rule on defensive measures turned on an assessment of
motives. See Cheffv. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 556 (Del. 1964). In Delaware, the difficulty of
discerning good from bad motives led to the development of the Unocal test, with its
elliptical incorporation of Cheffs inquiry into the threat posed by the bid. See Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953-54 (Del. 1985) (citing Cheff for
proposition that "in the acquisition of its shares a Delaware corporation may deal
selectively with its stockholders, provided the directors have not acted out of a sole or
primary purpose to entrench themselves in office").
74. See, e.g., Coffee Opinion, supra note 5. The Takeover Guidelines, supra note 9,
which contain an elaborate discussion of Delaware standards, were also provided in draft
form to the Livedoor court. Interview with Satoshi Kusakabe, Dir., Econ. & Indus. Policy
Bureau, METI, in N.Y., N.Y. (May 6, 2005). (Mr. Kusakabe was the chief METI official
overseeing the preparation of the Takeover Guidelines.)
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Gorkom case 75 and its aftermath is apparent in the business community's
reaction to the Daiwa case, discussed above, 7 6 imposing draconian per-
sonal liability on directors for breach of duty of care for failure to insti-
tute internal controls to detect unauthorized trading losses. 7 7 In the
United States, the Van Gorkom case was effectively overruled by the Dela-
ware legislature through the enactment of Section 102(b)(7), which al-
lows firms to eliminate personal directorial liability for breach of the duty
of care.78 Similarly, within a year after the Daiwa case was decided, Japan
amended its Commercial Code to permit firms to cap the personal liabil-
ity of directors by shareholder vote to a multiple of their annual salary,
subject to exceptions for intentional misconduct or gross negligence.
79
Thus, legislatures in both countries quickly mobilized responses to over-
turn judicial precedent viewed as dangerous to their business
communities.
C. Ministry Takeover Guidelines
Closely related to the formation of judge-made rules on permissible
responses to hostile bids in the Livedoor case is the formation of takeover
guidelines jointly endorsed by METI and the Ministry ofJustice, a process
that was undertaken at a feverish pace from August 2004 to May 2005. As
cross-shareholding declined precipitously and "in light of concerns about
the steady rise of hostile bids," METI established a Corporate Value Study
Group composed of legal experts and business representatives to con-
sider an appropriate policy response to hostile takeover activity.80 The
Study Group's work was based on four basic principles: enhancement of
corporate value, global standards, no discrimination between foreign and
Japanese firms, and expansion of choice.8 1 The Study Group's report,
issued in March 2005 in the midst of the Livedoor controversy, followed
75. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (holding that board of directors
acted with gross negligence in approving sale of corporation without adequately informing
themselves about the transaction).
76. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
77. The Daiwa case was ultimately settled during the appeals process. Even here, we
find legal strategy at work. The plaintiffs-wildly successful at the trial court level-settled
for a tiny fraction of the district court's damage award when Daiwa began to reorganize
itself as a holding company. This change in organizational structure, according to a
contemporaneous judicial decision, extinguishes the right of shareholders to sue
derivatively, because they are no longer shareholders of the original corporation, but of
the holding company. Aronson, supra note 56, at 42-43 & n.130.
78. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
79. Sh6h6 [Commercial Code], Law No. 48 of 1899, art. 266(7)-(23), translated in 2
EHS Law Bull. Series JA 121-26 (2004). In capping liability at a multiple of directors'
salary upon a shareholder vote, Japan actually adopted an approach similar to that
recommended by the American Law Institute rather than that taken by the Delaware
legislature. See 2 Am. Law Inst., Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and
Recommendations § 7.19 (1992).




extensive research and consultations with experts regarding Anglo-Ameri-
can takeover defenses and legal precedents.
The report is remarkable for its approval of Delaware takeover juris-
prudence.8 2 The report begins by noting that no Western country com-
pletely lacks defensive measures, because reasonable defensive measures
can enhance corporate and shareholder returns.8 3 It then provides an
exhaustive analysis of Delaware's experience with defensive measures, in
particular the poison pill, focusing on the Unocal rule and its progeny.
Unocal authorizes defensive measures in response to a threat to corporate
policy and effectiveness, provided the response is proportionate to the
threat.8 4 The report also suggests incorporation of doctrinal refinements
made in the wake of Unocal. For example, the report approvingly echoes
the Blasius requirement that a defensive measure interfering with the
shareholder franchise receive strictjudicial scrutiny,8 5 and emphasizes, as
a line of Delaware cases beginning with Unitrin6 has done, that the key
inquiry is whether, in spite of the defensive measures, shareholders retain
a realistic possibility of unseating the incumbent directors in a proxy con-
test. Finally, the report discusses incorporation of a Revlon-like rule8 7 re-
quiring the board to shift from defenders of the corporate bastion to
auctioneers seeking the highest price once the board has reached a deci-
sion to sell the firm.
8 8
The report notes that the establishment of defensive measures in Ja-
pan has been hampered by uncertainty over their legal effect, a paucity of
precedents and experience, and a lack of consensus on what constitutes
82. My discussions with members of the Study Group suggest that the transplantation
of Delaware principles into the Takeover Guidelines was unintentional, in the sense that
the Group's objective was not to endorse a particular country's takeover law as appropriate
for Japan. Rather, the objective was to identify the best standards by which to distinguish
corporate value-enhancing from value-destroying bids. Features of UK and EU takeover
law were also carefully considered. However, Delaware takeover doctrine emerged from
this process as a superior means of accomplishing that objective in the eyes of most,
though not necessarily all, members of the Study Group.
83. Corporate Value Study Group Report, supra note 7, at 9.
84. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
85. Blasius Indus. Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
86. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
87. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986).
88. Corporate Value Study Group Report, supra note 7, at 14-17. Ultimately, the
Study Group advised against direct transplantation of the Revlon rule in change-of-control
situations because of uncertainty, even in the United States, over the situations that trigger
Revlon duties. Yasushi Hatakeyama, Remarks at the Seminar on New Hostile Takeover
Guidelines in Japan (June 13, 2005). On the vagueness of Delaware takeover standards,
see infra text accompanying notes 137-138. Nonetheless, a version of the Revlon rule is
reflected in the Takeover Guidelines, which emphasize directors' fiduciary duty to evaluate
competing proposals and to refrain from implementing defensive measures that deprive
shareholders of the opportunity to consider competing proposals. See Takeover
Guidelines, supra note 9, at 5 n.2.
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reasonable defensive measures.8 9 It then favorably cites an opinion of the
Ministry of Justice that " [i]f adjusted for Japanese circumstances, most
defensive measures recognized in the U.S. and Europe can also be imple-
mented in Japan."90 Specifically, the report concludes that warrants (shin
kabu yoyaku ken) of the type Nippon Broadcasting tried to issue discrimi-
nately to Fuji TV can be used to implement a shareholder rights plan
(poison pill). Again drawing heavily on Delaware jurisprudence, the re-
port discusses ways to ensure and enhance the reasonableness of defen-
sive measures, including retaining the ability to replace the board
through a proxy contest, participation of independent directors and advi-
sors in the formulation of defensive measures, the use of "chewable pills,"
and shareholder approval. 91 In short, the report represents a major en-
dorsement of Delaware takeover jurisprudence in the formulation of Jap-
anese policy, down to doctrinal nuances such as disallowance of dead
hand pills. 9 2 Based in part on the Study Group's report, Takeover Guide-
lines were jointly issued by METI and the Ministry of Justice in May 2005.
The Takeover Guidelines are "modeled after typical defensive measures
that have been developed elsewhere," 9 3 and reflect the influence of Dela-
ware jurisprudence, although they place more emphasis on shareholder
approval of defensive measures as a means of ensuring fairness than does
Delaware doctrine.
94
Note the broad parallels to the United States in the 1980s, and the
common logic of the political economy that drove the reform process in
both countries. As Ronald Gilson has noted, a "corporate governance
system's development is driven, domino-like, by the linking of comple-
mentary institutions."9 5 In both countries, structural rigidities in the
economy, along with inefficient corporate structures, led mature firms to
waste free cash flow. Market change caused a rethinking of corporate
governance institutions and exposed problems in the corporate law. Ac-
89. Corporate Value Study Group Report, supra note 7, at 18.
90. Id. at 19.
91. Id. at 24-29. A "chewable pill" is automatically cancelled if an unsolicited bid
meets criteria specified when the pill is adopted.
92. Id. at 24. The report does recognize the need for certain additional steps to make
the U.S. measures fair and effective, such as establishing proper disclosure rules and
considering how to involve truly independent third parties in the decision to implement
and maintain a defensive measure. The report also notes that existing Japanese law offers
more flexibility to shareholders in that staggered boards are not used because directors'
terms are limited to one to two years, and there is no restriction on removing directors
midterm. Therefore, the report recommends departing from Delaware law by not
introducing a staggered board. Id.
93. Takeover Guidelines, supra note 9, at 3.
94. Id. at 6-14.
95. Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or




tors responded with legal strategies and informal adaptations, and by ex-
ercising choice. Complementarities emerged among these responses.
Over time, a new set of corporate governance institutions took shape. In
both systems, hostile takeovers helped catalyze these dynamics, in part
because they brought new players and new legal technologies into the
system. This is not meant to directly equate any features of the two sys-
tems, least of all Japan's incipient market for corporate control and the
booming U.S. takeover market of the 1980s. It is simply to note how basic
economic and legal dynamics driving Japan's corporate reform process
over the past decade mirror the U.S. experience of two decades ago, and
to highlight the role of hostile takeovers as a uniquely galvanizing force in
these processes. This basic model of corporate law and governance
change appears to have universal qualities.
IV. IMPLICATIONS: DELAWARE'S SHADOW
The analytical narrative has delivered us to the present, rather re-
markable moment, when Japan has just incorporated major principles of
Delaware takeover jurisprudence along with the poison pill into its own
system-albeit indirectly in the form of nonbinding guidelines-as a
means of dealing with the emergence of hostile takeovers. In this Part, I
provide a preliminary roadmap for understanding the implications of
these events. As a guide to this process, I draw on analytical constructs
that are now well engrained in the comparative corporate governance
literature. As we will see, while the literature is helpful in mapping the
possible implications forJapan, the rubrics it emphasizes mask important
features of the Japanese developments. Working through the implica-
tions for Japan in this way thus also provides an opportunity to offer some
comments on the state of the comparative corporate governance litera-
ture itself.
As noted in the Introduction, two fascinating literatures in compara-
tive corporate governance have emerged over the past decade that have a
direct bearing on the phenomena at issue here. The first asks whether
corporate governance structures among the world's major economic sys-
tems are converging, particularly on a U.S.-style, shareholder-oriented
model. At one end of the debate is a strong-form convergence theory
articulated most forcefully by Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman in
their provocative essay, The End of History for Corporate Law.9 6 They argue
that ideological convergence on the supremacy of the shareholder-ori-
ented model, which in their view has already occurred, is inducing similar
rules of corporate law and practice around the world, including similar
approaches to mergers and acquisitions. At the other end of the spec-
trum are scholars, including most prominently Lucian Bebchuk and
Mark Roe, who argue that path dependencies based on efficiencies and
96. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 14, at 439.
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rent seeking will slow corporate change and block convergence. 97 De-
spite the theoretical gridlock, the debate has led to the development of a
useful rubric for approaching the convergence question. It is now com-
monplace for scholars to distinguish formal convergence of laws from
functional convergence in the operation of corporate practices. 98 The
distinction attempts to capture the truism that identical formal rules in
different legal systems do not ensure functional equivalence in the opera-
tion of those systems.
The second debate, initiated by economists in what is known as the
"law and finance literature," seeks to identify the causal antecedents of
effective capital markets and high-growth economies. The central expla-
nation in this influential body of literature, supported by numerous em-
pirical studies, is the quality of shareholder protections provided by a
country's corporate law. The quality of a country's corporate law seems,
in turn, to depend on the historical origin of its legal system. Common
law systems appear to provide better investor protections than civil law-
particularly French civil law-systems. It is plausible that as a result, the
Anglo-American economies have larger capital markets and faster eco-
nomic growth than economies supported by European civil law.9 9 The
genius of Delaware law-the best of the best-shines bright in the wake
of this literature. Not surprisingly, commentators are beginning to ex-
plore ways to adapt features of Delaware law to foreign systems.10 0
With this conceptual background in mind, consider the significance
of Japan's recent turn to hostile takeovers and Delaware corporate law.
A. Delaware and the Future of Japanese Corporate Governance
1. Strong-Form Convergence. - In order to motivate the analysis, recall
the immediate consequence of the developments to date: a high degree
of tension in the political economy fostered by anxiety over the emer-
gence of new players and tactics perceived as deeply threatening to ex-
isting institutions.10 1 These tensions make further legal and market
97. Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 14, at 129-32.
98. See Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance, supra note 95, at 336-37.
99. See, e.g., La Porta, Law and Finance, supra note 13, at 1151-52 (empirically
associating "better" corporate law protections for minority shareholders in common law
systems with more dispersed shareholding and larger capital markets as compared to civil
law systems); La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 13, at 1132, 1149 (concluding
that "civil law, and particularly French civil law, countries, have both the weakest investor
protections and the least developed capital markets, especially as compared to common
law countries"); Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek
Might Be Right, 30 J. Legal Stud. 503, 505, 515 (2001) (empirically associating common
law systems with higher rates of GDP growth than civil law systems from 1960-1992).
100. For example, commentators have suggested that Delaware might set up a court
in leading European and Asian cities. See Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann,
Extraterritorial Courts for Corporate Law 4 (Feb. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
101. See supra Part I.D.
20051 2199
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
change inevitable. For example, adoption of the Takeover Guidelines
will necessitate yet another round of amendments to the corporate and
securities laws, at the very least to ensure that disclosure of takeover de-
fenses is adequate, tender offer rules are functional, and that there are
no mechanical inconsistencies between the existing corporate law struc-
tures and the implementation of defensive mechanisms contemplated by
the Takeover Guidelines. Indeed, the Corporate Value Study Group Re-
port itself anticipates this necessity.'0 2 The Tokyo Stock Exchange has
announced that it will alter its listing requirements, and a major pension
fund association has already changed its proxy voting guidelines, in both
cases to incorporate the principles of the Guidelines. 10 3 Thus, the Take-
over Guidelines, though technically nonbinding, are poised to have an
immediate effect on Japan's institutional environment for corporate gov-
ernance. The question is how actors will respond to all of these new
developments.
Proliferation of the Takeover Guidelines has already had two imme-
diate consequences, both with parallels in the U.S. experience. The first
is a wave of adoptions of (or at least keen interest in) the poison pill in
the Japanese market, 10 4 as firms avail themselves of a powerful defensive
measure that has been "officially" sanctioned by two prominent minis-
tries. The second is pressure for legislative protection against hostile
takeovers, fomented by managers and politicians dissatisfied with the ade-
quacy of the defensive measures contemplated by the Takeover Guide-
lines. 10 5 Indeed, a corporate governance committee of Japan's ruling
102. See Corporate Value Study Group Report, supra note 7, at 6.
103. Id. at 16, Supplemental Explanation 1. The Pension Fund Association has
announced four basic standards regarding the introduction of shareholder rights plans:
(1) management must adequately explain how they improve shareholder value; (2)
shareholder approval; (3) independent directors, in reliance on transparent principles,
must make decisions on employing, maintaining, or redeeming a plan in the face of an
offer; and (4) rights plans must be limited in duration and subject to reauthorization by
shareholders. K6sei Nenkin Kikin Reng6 Kai [Pension Fund Association], Kigy6 Baishai
B6eisaku ni Kansuru Kabunushi Giketsuken K6shi no Handan Kijun [Standards for
Exercising Shareholder Voting Rights Related to Corporate Takeovers] 1 (2005) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
104. See Andrew Morse, Poison Pills Emerge in Japan, Wall St. J., Apr. 11, 2005, at
C18 (reporting growing interest in poison pill). By early June 2005, nine Japanese firms
had adopted some version of a shareholder rights plan in the immediate wake of the
Livedoor contest and promulgation of the Takeover Guidelines. Goldman Sachs, Japan
Strategy Flash, May 27, 2005, at 4-5 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). During the
June 2005 annual shareholders meeting season, eight firms sought approval for some form
of a shareholder rights plan. Of these, six were structured in ways most closely resembling
U.S.-style poison pills. See Hiroshi Mitoma & Yuko Tamai, Rokugatsu Sokai Kaisha ni
okeru Kigy6 Baishu Boeisaku no D6nyfi to Sono Arikata [Defensive Measures Introduced
atJune Shareholders' Meetings and Their Characteristics], 1737 Shoji H6mu 30, 31 & tbl.1
(2005). Many more companies are actively considering introduction of such plans.
105. Rent-seeking responses to the exogenous shock of hostile takeovers are highly
predictable. See generally Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (1971)
(providing classic account of interest group behavior).
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Liberal Democratic Party is studying the moratorium and "other constitu-
ency statutes" enacted in the United States at the behest of managers in
the 1980s as possible models forJapan. 10 6
The convergence literature is useful in understanding the possible
implications of these developments for Japanese corporate governance.
First, consider the possibility of strong-form convergence. If Japan fol-
lows Delaware, its reform trajectory is clear. The number of independent
directors serving on boards should increase, and independent directors
may come to play a more pivotal role in structuring and negotiating ac-
quisitions, as this will enhance the probability that a court, deciding ex
post, will find the installation or retention of a poison pill to be a fair and
proportionate response to an unsolicited bid. In related fashion, there
could be a spike in adoptions of the U.S.-style board committee system,
which provides a structure suited to action by independent committees,
which have played a large role in Delaware takeover jurisprudence. Thus,
one possible consequence of the rise of hostile takeovers is that indepen-
dent directors will take on a much higher profile in Japanese corporate
governance, particularly as arbiters of newly competing constituencies
(shareholders, managers, and employees) in a world of contests for
control.
1 0 7
106. Attention among Japanese political and business leaders has focused on
Delaware's so-called moratorium statute, section 203. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 203
(2001 & Supp. 2004) (imposing restrictions on certain business combinations following
acquisition of large block of stock). "Other constituency statutes" expanding the scope of
managerial discretion in the face of a takeover bid are also receiving attention. See, e.g.,
15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1715 (West 1995) (allowing board of directors to consider effects
of any action on all groups affected by such action, and not requiring consideration of any
group's interests to be controlling). Thus far, however, passage of such statutes is not at
the forefront of the Liberal Democratic Party's policy agenda relating to takeovers. See
Jiyu Minshuto Sdgo Keizai Chosakai [Liberal Democratic Party General Economic
Investigation Committee], Kigy6 T6ji ni Kansuru Iinkai [Committee on Corporate
Governance], K6sei na M&A Rfiru ni Kansuru Teigen [Proposal on Fair M&A Rules], 1738
Sh6ji H6mu 42 (2005) [hereinafter LDP Proposal] (listing priorities for legal reform
related to M&A, but omitting mention of moratorium statute or other protective
measures).
107. Exactly what constitutes independence in the Japanese context is now the subject
of substantial debate. The corporate law does not require the presence of independent
directors on corporate boards, and there is no formal definition of independence in any
regulation or judicial ruling. Rather, the corporate law refers to "outside" (shagai)
directors, the definition of which is broad enough to include directors from a parent
company or sibling subsidiary. Sh6h6 [Commercial Code], Law No. 48 of 1899, art. 188,
translated in 2 EHS Law Bull. Series JA 49-50 (2004). The Takeover Guidelines finessed
this issue by referring to the useful role that "independent outside directors" (dokuritsu
shagai torishimariyaku) can play in enhancing the reasonableness of a defensive measure.
See Takeover Guidelines, supra note 9, at 17. In the wake of the Guidelines, there is a
movement to define independence. See Maboshii Hanrei Shishin Kyuzo [Rushing to
Create Guidelines [Due to] Sparse Precedent], Asahi Shimbun, June 10, 2005, at 1. The
Japan Association of Corporate Directors has proposed that independent directors be
mandatory for all listed companies. Independent Directors Needed to Avoid Poison Pill
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These adaptive responses by corporate management would likely
trigger strategic countermoves by other market actors. The widespread
existence of poison pills could invite increased use of the proxy fight,
heretofore little used in Japan, as a means of unseating incumbent man-
agement and thereby removing defensive measures. Proxy fights are po-
tentially a more potent weapon against the pill in Japan than in the
United States because staggering the board is not feasible underJapanese
corporate law, and directors can be removed without cause.1 08 Thus, it is
possible to replace a majority of the board in a single election, and
thereby redeem a pill standing in the way of an acquisition. Perhaps most
importantly, recent Japanese experience suggests that the incidence of
corporate litigation may increase significantly as market actors test the
validity of defensive measures. Indeed, Japan's first poison pill was imme-
diately tested in the courts by a foreign institutional shareholder. 10 9 The
generation of corporate law doctrine would accelerate as courts are con-
fronted with a myriad of new questions resulting from steady market in-
novations at the margins of existing legal rules.' 10 This would mark a
Abuse: Biz Group, Nikkei Net Interactive, June 18, 2005 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
108. Cf. Lucian Ayre Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered
Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 887, 925-33 (2002) (demonstrating
potency of poison pill in combination with staggered board). Under present conditions,
however, it may be unrealistic to place much confidence in the proxy process as a check on
defensive measures. Many observers believe that the Japanese proxy process is plagued by
practical problems such as short deadlines, untimely distribution of documents among
custodian layers, and a concentration of annual shareholders meetings on a single date.
See, e.g., Am. Chamber of Commerce in Japan, Comments on the Ronten Kokai of the
Corporate Value Study Group 5 (May 2005).
109. It flunked the test. David Ibison, Court Prohibits Nireco 'Poison Pill,' Fin.
Times, June 3, 2005, at 20. Significantly, the court expressly drew on the just-issued
Takeover Guidelines in striking down the pill. A problematic feature of the pill was that
rights were issued only to shareholders of record as of a certain date. Shareholders who
obtained shares after the record date would thus suffer dilution of their shares upon
exercise of the rights, even if they were not the hostile acquirer. The court ruled that the
rights plan imposed a threat of serious harm even to current shareholders, whose shares
might decline precipitously in value due to this feature. Shin Kabu Yoyaku Ken Hakko
Sashidome Karish6bun Meirei Moshitate Jiken [Provisional Order Enjoining Issuance of
Warrants], 1734 Shoji Homu 37, 45 (Tokyo D. Ct., June 1, 2005). In a portion of the
opinion that may prove highly influential, the court also ruled that rights plans should in
principle be approved by shareholders, and that where such approval is impractical, the
board must create a mechanism to ensure that the plan reflects the will of the
shareholders. Id. at 43. The court found the mechanism employed by Nireco-guidelines
delegating questions regarding deployment and redemption of the pill to a special
committee of independent directors whose decisions would be "fully respected" by the
board-to be too vague and uncertain to adequately ensure that the will of shareholders
would be protected. Id. at 44. In so ruling, the court appeared to impose more stringent
requirements for introduction of a rights plan than those contemplated by the Guidelines.
110. As the Delaware Chancery Court put it, "Since the 1980s, [corporate takeover
law], largely judge made, has been racing to keep abreast of the ever-evolving and novel
tactical and strategic developments so characteristic of this important area of economic
endeavor . . . ." Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180, 1185 (Del. Ch. 1998).
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major departure from the past, in which a dearth of novel transactions
stifled any significant role for ex post judicial review of fundamental cor-
porate issues.
In this scenario, the Japanese legal system, featuring a new degree of
mutability and susceptibility to shareholder monitoring, becomes super-
charged by changes in the surrounding capital markets and distribution
of shareholders.1 1 ' Substantive change is brought about by dynamics ex-
ternal to formal corporate governance institutions, as actors such as
Livedoor's Horie promote the erosion of corporate norms that stigmatize
redeployment of corporate assets to higher value uses as signaling failure
or social disharmony. Ultimately, the ensuing transformations force se-
nior managers to abandon their attachment to existing institutions. As
recounted by Ronald Gilson, this is essentially the story of the United
States in the 1980s. Similar developments outside the formal corporate
governance framework created forces for change so powerful that those
favoring existing institutions, particularly senior management, could not
contain them. The result was a dramatic transformation in American cor-
porate governance from a system that served largely to protect value-de-
stroying decisions by insular groups of senior executives to a model whose
attributes "animated international reform proposals."
' 12
To date, developments in Japan provide powerful-even astonish-
ing-evidence in support of the strong convergence theory. One way to
interpret these developments is that intellectual convergence on the
shareholder-oriented model, propelled by novel transactions driven by
overriding concern for financial returns, is gradually breaking down resis-
tance to change, and inexorably drawing Japan's corporate governance
institutions closer to those of the United States. Indeed, the Japanese
situation appears to be playing out in much the way that Professors
Hansmann and Kraakman have suggested: "As shareholding patterns be-
come more homogeneous (as we expect they will), and as corporate cul-
tures everywhere become more accommodating of takeovers (as it seems
destined to), takeovers presumably will become much more common in
Europe, Japan and elsewhere."1 13 As this Essay has shown, thus far, Dela-
ware's experience has proven highly salient to Japan. If the pattern
holds, Japan is on the threshold of convergence with Delaware corporate
rules and practices.
2. Cryonic Suspension. - But the convergence literature also suggests
a cautionary note to this conclusion: Formal convergence does not imply
functional convergence. Continued movement into the strong conver-
gence scenario of the kind I have just outlined rests on two related as-
111. Cf. Ronald J. Gilson, Catalyzing Corporate Governance: The Evolution of the
U.S. System in the 1980s, at 8-16 (Aug. 5, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (tracing similar changes in surrounding capital markets and
shareholder distribution during 1980s in the United States).
112. Id. at 7.
113. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 14, at 457-58.
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sumptions: First, that Japanese gravitation toward hostile takeovers and
Delaware takeover standards actually reflects ideological convergence on
the shareholder-primacy principle, at least by groups powerful enough to
break down adherence to existing institutions by incumbents. Second,
that Japanese adoption of Delaware takeover jurisprudence, whatever its
motivations, will result in convergence on Delaware takeover practice.
Upon closer inspection, neither assumption may be valid.
Consider why Japan transplanted Delaware takeover jurisprudence.
The first step in the process, at least implicitly, was rejection of an "indige-
nous" response to hostile takeovers in favor of "global" standards. An
indigenous response could have provided robust protections to non-
shareholder constituencies, particularly employees, who have been a pri-
mary focus of Japanese management in the postwar period. A powerful
precedent for such an approach exists in the German Takeover Code,
which permits adoption of any defenses, essentially without limitation, as
long as they are approved by a majority of the supervisory board (Aufsicht-
srat), half of whose members represent labor. 114 The Corporate Value
Study Group's implicit rejection of the German approach is even more
salient given thatJapanese corporate law was originally modeled after the
German Commercial Code-Japan's corporate law is classified as being
of German civil law origin in the law and finance literature-and the two
countries shared considerable institutional and social affinities in the
postwar period.
As with most foreign legal transplants, the decision to adopt a
"global" standard rather than to formulate an indigenous response is
fairly easy tojustify on practical grounds. 115 Time was of the essence, at
least if one credits the argument that market developments left Japanese
firms unduly vulnerable to unsolicited takeovers, particularly via poten-
tially coercive bids. Moreover, given the legal uncertainty about the valid-
ity of defenses and the lack of experience with such measures, the trans-
action-cost environment for the adoption of defensive measures was very
high. As the Corporate Value Study Group repeatedly emphasized, these
114. The German Takeover Code offers substantially more protection to target
management than is available under Delaware law. The supervisory board can sell off
pieces of the firm to prevent its acquisition (no Revlon rule) and there is no requirement
that defensive steps approved by the supervisory board be reasonable in relation to the
threat posed by an offer (no Unocal rule). Christian Kirchner & Richard W. Painter,
Takeover Defenses Under Delaware Law, the Proposed Thirteenth EU Directive and the
New German Takeover Law, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 451, 468 (2002); see also Gordon, supra
note 39, at 556.
115. This is not to discount the desire to adopt a transparent rule that would put all
players on equal footing. Interviews with participants in the METI process suggest a
genuine concern that to do otherwise would put Japan out of step with global markets and
create a unique set of rules that would not be understandable to outsiders, ultimately
harming Japanese firms, shareholders, and other constituencies. Telephone Interview
with Yasushi Hatakeyama, Managing Director, Lazard Freres (Apr. 10, 2005) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review). (Mr. Hatakeyama was an outside advisor to the Corporate Value
Study Group.)
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factors prevented the formation of market consensus on what constitutes
fair and enforceable measures. In such an environment, adoption of a
respected, market-tested foreign code or practice may have been viewed
as the only viable response. Notably, the process followed in this epi-
sode-forming a committee of experts under the auspices of an influen-
tial ministry to study foreign systems and recommend a solution to ajapa-
nese policy problem-has a long history in Japan.
But why Delaware? The law and finance literature might suggest that
the choice reflects the acknowledged superiority of Delaware law in pro-
tecting shareholders. But another Anglo-American-based "global" stan-
dard was available in the form of the British City Code on Takeovers and
Mergers. 116 The City Code has served as the model for the takeover
codes of several other countries, including some in Asia. 117 The City
Code represents a very different approach to takeovers than Delaware
law, mandating "strict neutrality" of target boards in the face of a takeover
bid, and prohibiting directors from installing defensive measures without
shareholder approval. 118 In return for board neutrality, takeover bids are
regulated, principally through a mandatory offer rule, to prevent unfair
or coercive tactics.' 1 9 A Takeover Panel composed of experts engages in
a variety of interpretive and disciplinary activities designed to enhance
compliance with the Code. Arguably, the City Code represents a more
attractive candidate for transplant into Japan than Delaware takeover law.
Its relatively straightforward rules are much simpler to replicate and en-
force than a complex body of foreign judicial doctrine. And the quasi-
administrative role of the Takeover Panel is more consistent with tradi-
tional Japanese approaches to economic regulation than Delaware's
court-centric approach. Moreover, one facet of existing Japanese tender
offer procedures is borrowed from the City Code.
120
116. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers
(2005), available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/code/code.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter City Code].
117. Malaysia and Singapore have takeover laws based on the City Code. Mark Gillen
& Pittman Potter, The Convergence of Securities Laws and Implications for Developing
Securities Markets, 24 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 83, 91 (1998). Note that the legal
systems of both these countries have strong affinities with the U.K. legal system.
118. City Code, supra note 116, at gen. princ. 7 (prohibiting target company's board,
after receiving offer, from taking any action "in relation to the affairs of the company,
without the approval of the shareholders in general meeting, which could effectively result
in any bona fide offer being frustrated or in the shareholders being denied an opportunity
to decide on its merits").
119. Id. at rule 9.1 (requiring that shareholder crossing 30% voting rights threshold
extend offers to all outstanding classes of shares).
120. Japan's Securities Exchange Act requires that an off-exchange offer, the
acceptance of which would result in the acquisition of more than 33.3% of the target's
shares, be made through a tender offer open to all shareholders. Shoken Torihiki Ho
[Securities Exchange Act], Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-2(1) [4], translated in Securities and
Exchange Law, Cabinet Order and Selected Ordinances: As in Effect April 1, 2001
(Capital Mkts. Research Inst. 2001). In contrast to the mandatory bid rule of the City
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Without discounting the role that the comparative intellectual ap-
peal of Delaware law played in the decision to embrace Delaware jurispru-
dence over the City Code, 12 1 several other factors appear to have influ-
enced the choice. As with any transplant, familiarity with the foreign law
among the experts responsible for interpreting and enforcing it appears
to have played a role in the adoption of the Takeover Guidelines. 122 Del-
aware corporate law is familiar to many Japanese lawyers, economic bu-
reaucrats, and judges, many of whom have studied in U.S. law schools.
More specifically, at least one-third of the Corporate Value Study Group's
members have extensive exposure to Delaware corporate law.123 The
City Code is far less familiar to the Japanese legal community. At the
same time, implementing a mandatory bid rule was perceived as disad-
vantageous because it would prevent potentially efficient partial bids, and
would require major changes to the tender offer provisions of the securi-
ties law, which may have been politically problematic. 124 Perhaps most
importantly for the ministries endorsing the Takeover Guidelines and the
political constituencies to which they respond, Delaware takeover juris-
prudence is more protective of management than the City Code. Adop-
tion of the City Code, therefore, would have run counter to the strong
tradition of concern for nonshareholder constituencies in Japan, and ex-
acerbated fears of a wave of foreign takeovers of Japanese firms. The
Corporate Value Study Group expressly cited alleviation of this fear as a
reason for formulating the Guidelines.1 25 The failure of the European
Union's Thirteenth Company Law Directive on Takeovers (which was
closely based on the City Code) is an indication of the controversial na-
Code, however, the offer does not have to be for all outstanding shares. Nonetheless, the
City Code was the model for this provision. See Milhaupt & West, supra note 68, at 306.
121. On the intellectual appeal of Delaware law, see infra text accompanying notes
147-149. Several members of the Corporate Value Study Group indicated that the
flexibility of Delaware takeover law, which allows courts to distinguish between value-
enhancing and value-destroying bids, was preferred over the comparatively more rigid City
Code rules.
122. See David Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 163, 189
(2003) (finding that legal transplants are more likely to be successful where "the
population is already familiar with the basic principles of [the] laws").
123. Seven of the twenty-one members are either corporate lawyers or corporate law
scholars.
124. The Securities Exchange Act is the province of the Financial Services Agency, not
METI or the Ministry ofJustice. Policy coordination among the three organizations can be
difficult. The Liberal Democratic Party has proposed studying the enactment of a
mandatory bid rule in Japan. See LDP Proposal, supra note 106, at 44. Note the potential
hazards of this type of piecemeal reform: The mandatory bid rule is designed to
complement the board neutrality principle, not a powerful defensive measure like the
poison pill (and indeed the poison pill is not used in the United Kingdom). Japan's
Takeover Guidelines clearly reject the board neutrality principle and endorse the poison
pill. Adding a mandatory bid rule in addition to the defenses already contemplated by the
Takeover Guidelines would thus create a far stronger defensive environment than exists
either in the United Kingdom or the United States.
125. See Corporate Value Report, supra note 67, at 15.
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ture of a decidedly shareholder-oriented approach to hostile bids, 126 and
may have at least subconsciously sounded a cautionary note for Japanese
policy planners. Thus, Delaware takeover law provided the METI and
Ministry ofJustice planners with the best of all possible worlds: a familiar
and politically attainable "global" standard that is simultaneously some-
what protective of management.
127
Adoption of Delaware standards and validation of the poison pill in
the Takeover Guidelines also has fascinating parallels to the interest-
group explanation for the development of Delaware law provided by Ma-
cey and Miller. 128  The enormous potential business opportunity
presented by METI's undertaking was not lost on the lawyers and finan-
cial advisors (both Japanese and American) directly involved in the pro-
cess of formulating and promoting the Takeover Guidelines. Selection of
the City Code approach would have sharply limited the role of U.S. advi-
sors in Japanese contests for corporate control and elevated the position
of U.K. firms in what promises to be a large new market for legal services
in Japan. Japan's transplantation of Delaware takeover jurisprudence, by
contrast, is a potential bonanza for U.S. firms. Literally overnight, a new
market of more than three thousand public companies has been created
for the poison pill, a sophisticated piece of legal technology developed
and market tested in the United States. While the U.S. version of the
poison pill cannot be adopted as is under Japanese corporate law, the
accumulated experience of U.S. law firms with hostile takeovers and de-
fensive measures will be highly attractive to Japanese corporations now
that Japan's institutional environment for takeovers has taken on a dis-
tinctly U.S. cast. For elite Japanese corporate lawyers as well, most of
whom received graduate legal education in the United States and are
members of the New York or California bars, the transplantation of Dela-
ware takeover law, particularly the need to adapt the poison pill to the
domestic legal regime, presents a substantial new business opportu-
nity. 129 In fact, major Japanese law firms quickly began marketing their
own signature poison pills, utilizing different structures designed to over-
come technical hurdles presented by Japanese corporate law.
126. See Gordon, supra note 39 (using Germany as example of hostility towards
European Union's Thirteenth Directive); Kirchner & Painter, supra note 114 (explaining
Thirteenth Directive and potential alternatives).
127. Some involved in the METI process also argue that the Delaware approach is
more consistent with Japan's deregulatory movement because an essential corollary to the
board neutrality principle under the City Code is the regulation of bids to protect
shareholders from unfair or coercive offers. METI supposedly preferred the system of
market ordering made possible through the board's gatekeeping function under Delaware
law. Interview with Satoshi Kusakabe, supra note 74. This argument, however, overlooks
the regulatory aspects of court-centered ex post review of takeover defenses, as well as the
elaborate regulation of the tender offer process under the U.S. securities laws.
128. See supra text accompanying note 59.
129. See, e.g., Katsuky6 "Dokuyaku Bijinesu" [Rapidly Developing "Poison Business"],
Asahi Shimbun,June 8, 2005, at 9 (reporting on marketing efforts by lawyers and financial
advisors rushing to fill demand for defensive measures created by Livedoor contest).
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The point is not that METI caved in to special interests or that the
selection of Delaware law was a disingenuous cover for protectionism.
The point is simply thatJapan's gravitation toward Delaware takeover law
is the product of multiple motivations and, as such, is highly ambiguous
with regard to the signal it sends about ideological convergence on the
shareholder primacy norm.1 30 In that sense, the takeover developments
are similar to several other corporate reforms in Japan over the past dec-
ade, which outwardly enhance the ability of shareholders to monitor
management, but may actually increase agency slack in the absence of
complementary reforms such as the emergence of truly independent di-
rectors and robust judicial review.13 1
From this perspective, particularly one informed by path-depen-
dency-based skepticism about convergence, it is possible to envision a very
different set of implications for Japan. Current developments may not
trigger adaptive and strategic responses that supercharge Japan's corpo-
rate governance institutions. To the contrary, the Takeover Guidelines
may simply increase managerial entrenchment. By validating adoption of
the poison pill, the Takeover Guidelines may simply lock insular boards
in place and provide a perfect substitute for the disappearing institution
of cross-shareholding. 132 As scholars have pointed out, to the extent that
the poison pill has worked in the United States as a negotiating tool for
the benefit of shareholders rather than simply as a means of blocking
bids that threaten incumbent managers, it has worked because of the sur-
rounding infrastructure of independent directors, judges capable of dis-
cerning proper from improper motivations for adoption of a pill, and
capital market pressure.1 3 3 If much of this infrastructure is missing in
130. Some commentators do not read Delaware law as unambiguously supporting the
shareholder primacy norm even in the United States. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 791,
798-813 (2002) (arguing that director primacy explains Delaware takeover jurisprudence
better than does shareholder primacy).
131. CurtisJ. Milhaupt, A Lost Decade for Japanese Corporate Governance Reform?:
What's Changed, What Hasn't, and Why, in Institutional Change in Japan (Magnus
Blomstr6m & Sumner La Croix eds., forthcoming 2006).
132. This outcome is the early prediction of some analysts. See Morse, supra note 104
(reporting concerns that Japanese managers, "infatuated with the notion of protecting
themselves even before they have learned how to address the needs of shareholders," may
use poison pills to hurt long-term value ofJapanese firms). Many foreign market players in
Japan share this pessimistic view of the Takeover Guidelines. However, for a sanguine view
by prominent analysts, see Naoki Kamiyama & Robert A. Feldman, No Need for Pessimism
on Poison Pills, Morgan Stanley Strategy and Economics, June 21, 2005, at 2 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (concluding that Takeover Guidelines have usefully absorbed
Delaware doctrine, institutional investors will not agree to excessive defensive measures,
and courts will favor shareholders).
133. E.g., RonaldJ. Gilson, The Poison Pill injapan: The Missing Infrastructure, 2004
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 21, 33-40 (2004). Of course, this puts to one side the more
fundamental questions of whether the courts are the proper arbiters of contests for
corporate control and, even if so, whether existing Delaware takeover doctrine maximizes
shareholder value. These questions are longstanding and contentious issues in the United
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Japan-and it is certainly possible to identify important gaps in the infra-
structure as of this writing' 34-the pill may freeze market actors in their
tracks. Indeed, Jeff Gordon has suggested that this may be the conse-
quence of Germany's Takeover Code. 135 In this path-dependency scena-
rio, adoption of Delaware takeover law reinforces rather than transforms
the existing institutional set up.
3. Selective Adaptation and the Struggle to Interpret "Delaware" Law. -
Yet in all likelihood, neither the strong convergence nor the cryonic sus-
pension effects of the pill outlined in the scenarios above will come to
pass in precisely this fashion. This follows from a basic truth: We simply
do not know how Delaware takeover jurisprudence and the poison pill
will operate in Japan. Legal transplants are always tenuous experiments,
and this particular transplant may be especially unpredictable. Japan has
borrowed, not a single legal rule or procedural mechanism, but a com-
plex body of common law principles and a sophisticated legal technology
in the form of the shareholder rights plan, which evolved through an
iterative process of strategic and adaptive responses over two decades in
tandem with market developments. 13 6 The Takeover Guidelines, by con-
trast, are the result of a rapid, top-down process of law reform. The con-
sequences of this experiment grow even harder to discern considering
that Delaware takeover jurisprudence, consisting of loosely defined, fact-
intensive standards, is indeterminate even on home soil.137 If Delaware
States. For a summary of the major positions in this debate, see Kahan & Rock, supra note
10. If Delaware doctrine is itself suboptimal, even perfect replication of the Delaware
doctrine in Japan would not constitute the optimal response to this policy issue.
134. Five examples stand out: (1) It is not possible under current Japanese law to
make a tender offer conditional on redemption or invalidation of a poison pill. Thus, if a
bidder fails to unseat an incumbent board in a proxy contest waged parallel to the tender
offer (and thus cannot cause the poison pill to be redeemed) but obtains shares in the
tender offer sufficient to trigger the poison pill, the bidder will suffer massive dilution of its
ownership in the target. The risk of this outcome will significantly deter hostile bids. (2)
The viability of the proxy process is undermined by a variety of logistical problems, and it
has never been successfully used to unseat incumbent management. (3) Weak disclosure
requirements and a tradition of deference to management may reduce the effectiveness of
shareholder approval of defensive measures as a robust check on managerial
entrenchment. (4) Japan lacks a tradition of (or legal requirements for) a high degree of
directorial independence. (5) Disadvantageous tax treatment of exchange offers makes it
problematic to use bidder's securities as merger consideration, severely limiting the types
of deals that are feasible. Reforms to the tender offer process to permit conditioning an
offer on redemption of the pill are already contemplated. See LDP Proposal, supra note
106, at 43.
135. See Gordon, supra note 39, at 550-51.
136. For an outline of the process (for the benefit of a Japanese audience) from the
perspective of a Delaware Chancery Courtjudge, see William B. Chandler III, Hostile M&A
and the Poison Pill in Japan: A judicial Perspective, 2004 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 45 (2004).
137. See, e.g., Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in
Corporate Law, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1908, 1915-18 (1998) (arguing that Unocal test and
related takeover doctrines are indeterminate because Delaware courts rely heavily on




law in the hands of the Delaware judiciary represents one of "the more
extreme forms of unpredictable ex post decisionmaking," t 38 application
of those same open-textured standards by Japanese judges, operating with
different professional training in a different social and economic climate,
is likely to be all the more unpredictable. 139 At a minimum, Japanese
judges can be expected to demonstrate heightened concern for takeovers
that pose a threat to stable employment, given the relatively illiquid labor
market and tradition of judicial activism to protect workers against dis-
charge. Delaware law may look quite different in Tokyo than in
Wilmington.
Evidence of this is already apparent in the Tokyo High Court's
Livedoor opinion. The opinion plainly resonates with Unocal's determina-
tion that a threat to the firm can justify a proportionate defensive re-
sponse by management. Similarly, as in Unocal, despite concerns about
conflicts of interest in change-of-control situations, the court implicitly
positions the board as the appropriate organ to initially evaluate the
threat to corporate value posed by a hostile bid, and suggests that there
must be broad latitude to consider the issue from "mid- and long-term
perspectives relating to developments in the economy, society, culture,
and technology, etc.," subject ultimately to the "business judgment and
evaluation of shareholders and the stock market. 1 40 Yet the court goes
far beyond what is necessary to decide the case in enumerating situations
that would justify management's (virtually preclusive) massively dilutive
issuance of warrants to a friendly shareholder in the face of a hostile bid.
The court indicates that an abusive motive justifying such a response
would include a bidder's intent to pledge assets of the target as collateral
for debts of the acquirer or to sell target assets to pay down those
debts.141 Note that, taken literally, this dictum would effectively preclude
leveraged buyouts; although it is unclear whether the court intended to
fashion such a sweeping rule. 14 2 In short, the High Court's decision
could be the foundation for development of a Unocal rule with Japanese
138. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 14, at 459.
139. Even U.S. lawyers disagree over how Delaware takeover standards would apply to
actual Japanese transactions. Compare Stephen Givens, Derawea-shfi Saik6sai de Attara,
Konkai UFJ H6rudingusugawa ga Totta Gappei T6g6 B6shisaku in Taishite, Dono Y6 na
Shih6 Handan wo Kudashita de ar6 ka? [What Judicial Decision Would Have Been
Handed Down if the Defensive Measures Adopted by UFJ Holdings Were Before the
Delaware Supreme Court?], 32 Kokusai Sh6ji H6mu 1295, 1315 (2004) (arguing that
Revlon duties would apply to the UFJ board), with Robert G. DeLaMater, Director
Fiduciary Duties in the Context of M&A Transactions: Relevance of U.S. Experience in
Japan 8 & n.19 (Mar. 9, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (arguing Revlon duties would not apply).
140. Nippon H6s6 K.K. v. Raibudoa K.K., 1173 Hanrei Taimuzu 125, 132 (Tokyo
High Ct., Mar. 23, 2005).
141. Id. at 133.
142. Kenichi Osugi, Livedoor vs. NBS Case: Recent Judicial Decisions on a Hostile
Takeover Battle in Japan and their Implications 5 & n.ll (May 20, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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characteristics-preventing egregious entrenchment attempts by incum-
bent management, but sanctioning airtight defenses to protect a range of
corporate interests that appear very broad from a U.S. perspective.
As with any transplant, Japanese actors can be expected to adapt Del-
aware law principles reflected in the Takeover Guidelines to suit their
own interests, and the law is malleable enough to accommodate strategic
use by both managers and shareholders. This phenomenon is neither
unusual nor necessarily negative, but it is noteworthy. Anecdotal evi-
dence already suggests that, even before the ink is dry on the Report and
Takeover Guidelines, the transplanted standards are being given differ-
ent interpretations, depending on the interests of the interpreter. One
commentator, for example, warns that if American concepts such as the
Revlon rule and the fiduciary out gain currency in Japan, they will enable
foreign firms to "intrude" on mergers between Japanese firms.143 Seek-
ing to expand the market for the poison pill in the immediate wake of the
Livedoor ruling, some Japanese lawyers promoted the view-certainly not
consistent with Delaware law-that preplanned defenses would not have
to be subsequently reviewed for reasonableness in the face of an unsolic-
ited offer. U.S. legal and financial advisors-arguably big winners in the
evolution of Delaware corporate law14 4 -actively promoted the Takeover
Guidelines as the optimal way to fill the "void" in Japanese law exposed by
the recent hostile bids. 14 5 In this regard, METI's role in spearheading
the formulation of guidelines that led to Japan's embrace of Delaware is
also noteworthy. While METI's initiative is consistent with its involvement
in other corporate governance reforms in recent years, METI is arguably
not the most appropriate agency to formulate a coordinated response to
hostile takeovers. It has no formal jurisdiction over the corporate or se-
curities laws, and other governmental actors such as the Financial Super-
visory Agency and the Securities Exchange Surveillance Commission (a
rough analogue to the SEC) seem more appropriately situated to formu-
late a governmental response to this policy issue. But METI is close to the
corporate sector, which obviously has a direct stake in the approved de-
fenses to hostile bids. By responding rapidly with nonbinding guidelines
crafted under its auspices, in contrast to a legislative response over which
it may have had little control or lasting role, METI deftly ensured that it
would be at the center of future developments in this important area of
economic policy. Significantly however, thus far the Japanese courts
seem inclined to stake out a central role for themselves as arbiters of con-
tests for control-not unlike the Delaware courts.
143. Hiroshi Mitoma, Gaishi ni yoru Nihon Kigyo no Baishai to Taiyasaku [Foreign
Acquisitions of Japanese Firms and a Policy Response], 1731 Sh6ji H6mu 43, 45 & fig.3
(2005).
144. See Macey & Miller, supra note 10, at 514-22.
145. Interview with representatives of Lazard Freres and Sullivan & Cromwell, in N.Y.,
N.Y. (May 6, 2005).
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This struggle for interpretive control over "Delaware" law in Japan
does not clearly reflect either the embrace of the shareholder-oriented
model predicted by strong convergence theories and the law and finance
literature, or the path-dependency-driven blockage of institutional
change predicted by convergence skeptics. Rather, it reflects a continua-
tion of the process of corporate law evolution highlighted throughout
this Essay-strategic adaptation to new market realities. The end result
of this process in Japan cannot be predicted today, but new corporate
governance institutions that depart markedly from the postwar institu-
tions are plainly under construction. To cite just two examples, the
courts now constitute an important new player in Japanese corporate gov-
ernance, and concepts such as "corporate value," "independent direc-
tors," and "shareholders as ultimate owners of the corporation" loosed in
the current debate over defensive measures appear to be taking on a life
of their own, altering the way market actors and judges respond to a
range of issues outside the takeover context.
B. Implications of Japan's Experience for the Comparative Corporate
Governance Literature
Scholars have made major advances in understanding both the im-
pact of globalization on corporate governance and the significance of
corporate law to variations in economic structures and success around
the world. Yet collectively, the convergence and law and finance litera-
tures still offer a rather anemic account of how corporate law evolves and
why it matters to economic success. The Japanese experience offers a
new perspective on these issues.
1. Delaware's (Ambiguous) Intellectual Appeal as a Force for Convergence.
-Japan's new Takeover Guidelines, along with recent amendments to
the Commercial Code promoting organizational flexibility and freedom
of choice in board structures, clearly reflect in part the powerful intellec-
tual appeal of Delaware corporate law around the world today. The ma-
jor features of Delaware corporate law-its flexible, enabling structure
promoting freedom of contract among corporate constituencies, the
prevalence of broad standards over detailed rules, and the protection of
shareholders by a sophisticated judiciary policing the boundaries of direc-
torial conduct ex post with an eye toward the incentive effects of their
decisions on other corporate actors-have become the ideal features of a
corporate law regime in the eyes of many commentators.'
4 6
146. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of
Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale L.J. 1, 60-64
(2001) (hypothesizing that flexible role of the common law judge plays important part in
protecting investors); Luca Enriques, Off the Books but on the Record: Evidence from
Italy on the Relevance ofJudges to the Quality of Corporate Law, in Global Markets, supra
note 68, at 257, 262-64, 270-81 (measuring quality of Italian corporate law judging against
standards arguably describing features of Delaware judiciary); Katharina Pistor &
Chenggang Xu, Fiduciary Duty in Transitional Civil Law Jurisdictions: Lessons from the
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The Japanese case suggests, however, that Delaware's intellectual ap-
peal does not reside exclusively in its shareholder primacy, as Hansmann
and Kraakman's ideological-convergence hypothesis would suggest, or in
its superior shareholder protections, as the law and finance literature
would imply. Rather, in addition to the prosaic but significant impact of
increasing familiarity with Delaware corporate law around the world,
1 47
the deeper appeal seems to spring from its elastic quality, which is well
suited to interest-group balancing, its deregulatory emphasis on freedom
of choice and facilitation of transactions, and the way in which judicial
application of broad fiduciary duties deftly regulates potentially problem-
atic conduct by encouraging disclosure and procedural integrity.
148
These features make Delaware corporate law ideally suited for global mar-
kets, which thrive on transparency, flexibility, and equality of access and
treatment. This is not to deny Delaware law's protection of shareholder
interests. But what is most intriguing aboutJapan's embrace of Delaware
takeover jurisprudence and the poison pill is the very real possibility,
sketched out above, that Delaware law can be adapted to suit rather dif-
ferent interests than it does in the United States. The very elasticity and
visceral emphasis on fairness that make Delaware jurisprudence appeal-
ing globally may ensure that it will produce different results in different
jurisdictions. Convergence on Delaware law as a global standard may
thus support continuing diversity of priorities within the expansive rubric
of enhancing corporate value.
Japan's use of Delaware corporate law in shaping its approach to
takeovers invites further reflection on the distinction now prevalent in
the literature between formal and functional convergence. For all its ana-
lytical power, this dichotomy is conceptually somewhat misleading. "For-
mal convergence" suggests that borrowed rules replace local rules. Yet his-
tory provides few examples of successful economies voluntarily
overwriting vast tracts of their laws with foreign transplants. Rather, for-
eign-law borrowing tends to be highly piecemeal and selective. Moreo-
ver, the dichotomy is false to the extent it implies a lack of interaction
between transplanted rules and local practices. The Japanese case sug-
gests that a more informative analytical construct for thinking about the
process by which foreign legal knowledge is incorporated into local re-
gimes is institution telescoping and stacking. In practice, borrowed rules
Incomplete Law Theory, in Global Markets, supra note 68, at 77, 77-78 (arguing that
broad fiduciary duties and enabling nature of Delaware law are important to its success).
147. Note the cross-border parallel to the network-effects explanation for the
prevalence of Delaware charters in the United States. See Michael Klausner, Corporations,
Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va. L. Rev. 757, 843-47 (1995).
148. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Architecture of American Corporate Law:
Facilitation and Regulation 19-23 (Mar. 14, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Columbia Law Review) ("Delaware statutory corporate law is terrific at facilitating
corporate transactions and conduct .... [T]he Delaware courts . . . have developed an




(and the home-country experience surrounding their formation and in-
terpretation) are telescoped into a convenient or politically palatable
package and stacked atop existing institutions in the host country. Only
through repeated strategic and adaptive responses by local actors are the
new rules and the old institutions eventually welded together into some-
thing functionally operative. By that point, the result is inevitably distinct
from both the borrowed rule as it operated in the home country and the
pre-existing institution in the host country. Telescoping and stacking
may be mechanisms of convergence, but that is not the inevitable out-
come of the process. The Japanese case indicates not so much a formal
or functional convergence of Japanese and Delaware corporate law as an
unpredictable telescoping and stacking of two decades of Delaware judi-
cial doctrine on top of existing Japanese institutions. The phenomenon
is not new-the entire history of foreign law adaptation in Japan (and
perhaps foreign borrowing generally) bears these characteristics. 14 9 But
the dichotomous convergence debate (in the literature, systems are ei-
ther said to be converging on a single model or not), and the formal-
versus-functional rubric mask important features of the process of reform
in Japan.
2. Corporate Law as a Focal Point for Institutional Transformation. - A
final point relates to the role of corporate law in successful economies,
the subject of much theorizing in the wake of the law and finance litera-
ture. The implication widely drawn from this literature is that corporate
law "matters"-and matters almost exclusively-for the protections it pro-
vides to minority shareholders. 150 Yet given the ambiguities we have just
seen with regard to Delaware corporate law on this point, the Japanese
case, particularly when examined side-by-side with Delaware's own experi-
ence in the 1980s, actually suggests a quite different role for corporate
law in successful economies.
At key moments in the institutional transformation of the world's
two largest economies, the corporate law became the focal point for a
highly iterative process of market innovation and strategic legal re-
sponse.1 5 ' The process involved an array of actors seeking to create or
149. Several commentators on earlier drafts suggested that telescoping and stacking
also describe the unpredictable process by which new doctrines and practices are
selectively assimilated into religions.
150. See Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and
Control in the United Kingdom, 30J. Legal Stud. 459, 462 (2001) ("A series of empirical
studies have given the 'law matters' story a powerful boost .... The message suggested by
these results is that ownership concentration is a consequence of poor legal protection of
minority shareholders." (internal citation omitted)). The accuracy of this message is
subject to dispute, as Cheffin's own analysis and that of other scholars indicates. See id. at
465. Accurate or not, however, the law and finance literature has occupied a large space in
comparative corporate governance scholarship over the past decade, leading to a measure
of fixation on corporate law's role in protecting minority investors to the exclusion of
other possible roles.




adapt to new rules in the pursuit of their respective interests. At pivotal
moments in the process, market entrepreneurs such as the hostile bid-
ders at the center of this Essay pushed the envelope of accepted conduct,
forcing the legal system to respond anew, triggering yet another round of
accommodating reactions. This process was repeated until all major ac-
tors internalized a relatively stable new set of expectations about how the
world works, and a new system of corporate governance took shape that
better fit the new market realities. This process came to rest in the
United States, relatively speaking, with the Delaware Supreme Court's ap-
proval of the 'Just say no" defense and the acceptance by all relevant ac-
tors of the pill in its current form. 15 2 In Japan, the process of internal-
izing a significant new set ofjudicial rulings, new legal technologies such
as rights plans, and nonbinding guidelines supplementing the formal cor-
porate and securities laws has just begun. Yet already, market expecta-
tions about what constitutes a reasonable reaction to a hostile bid and the
proper role of boards, shareholders, and other actors in erecting defen-
sive measures have been affected. Japan will find its own equilibrium
point in this process of shifting expectations as it fits Delaware takeover
jurisprudence to the dictates of its own political economy.
Thus, in both systems, corporate law has crucially served to coordi-
nate the expectations of market participants during phases of institu-
tional transition. t 53 This role for corporate law has been largely over-
looked in the comparative corporate governance literature, which has
become fixated on minority shareholder protections. 154 Returning to the
discussion of convergence, gravitation toward Delaware corporate law
may signal recognition in other countries, at least implicitly, that its main
features are well suited to playing this central role in efficient economic
adaptation. Serving as a focal point for market and institutional change
may in fact be one of the most important ways in which corporate law
matters to successful economies.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has analyzed a series of recent contests for corporate con-
trol in Japan and the development of a policy response to the emergence
of hostile M&A in that country. The analysis has emphasized parallels
with the Delaware experience, particularly the uniquely catalyzing effect
of hostile M&A on corporate law development. In the Japan of the 2000s
as in the United States of the 1980s, corporate law-whatever its signifi-
cance as a device to protect shareholders-became the focal point for
institutional transformation in the economy. In a rather remarkable de-
152. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 10, at 877-87.
153. For a discussion of the role of securities law as a focal point for market transition
in developing economies, see Robert B. Ahdieh, Law's Signal: A Cueing Theory of Law in
Market Transition, 77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 215 (2004).




velopment, Delaware's takeover experience has become particularly sali-
ent to Japan, as influential ministries have recently endorsed the poison
pill along with significant principles of Delaware takeover jurisprudence.
The outcome of this experiment in foreign law transplantation is un-
certain, because the process is only now approaching a climax. The con-
vergence and law and finance literatures in comparative corporate gov-
ernance provide powerful analytical frameworks for understanding the
Japanese developments and their possible implications for the future. At
the same time, however, these literatures may deflect attention from the
iterative process of selective borrowing and strategic adaptation-what I
have called institution telescoping and stacking-that characterizes for-
eign law transplantation and corporate reform in Japan, and probably
elsewhere. This process, which is heavily colored by interest-group dy-
namics, may often serve as the mechanism of convergence, but that out-
come is not inevitable: Ultimately, the new institutions may bear only
passing resemblance to the foreign models on which they are based. Re-
gardless of the precise path of future changes initiated by the rise of hos-
tile takeovers in Japan, this episode bears watching as a remarkable exam-
ple of the transplantation of foreign institutions, and potentially as a
watershed moment in the evolution of corporate law and governance in
the world's second largest economy.
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